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Abstract
This paper discusses an alternative to conditioning that may be used when the probabil-
ity distribution is not fully specified. It does not require any assumptions (such as CAR:
coarsening at random) on the unknown distribution. The well-known Monty Hall prob-
lem is the simplest scenario where neither naive conditioning nor the CAR assumption
suffice to determine an updated probability distribution. This paper thus addresses a
generalization of that problem to arbitrary distributions on finite outcome spaces, arbi-
trary sets of ‘messages’, and (almost) arbitrary loss functions, and provides existence
and characterization theorems for robust probability updating strategies. We find that
for logarithmic loss, optimality is characterized by an elegant condition, which we call
RCAR (reverse coarsening at random). Under certain conditions, the same condition
also characterizes optimality for a much larger class of loss functions, and we obtain
an objective and general answer to how one should update probabilities in the light of
new information.
Keywords: probability updating, maximum entropy, loss functions, minimax decision
making
1. Introduction
There are many situations in which a decision maker receives incomplete data and
still has to reach conclusions about these data. One type of incomplete data is coarse
data: instead of the real outcome of a random event, the decision maker observes a
subset of the possible outcomes, and knows only that the actual outcome is an element
of this subset. An example frequently occurs in questionnaires, where people may be
asked if their date of birth lies between 1950 and 1960 or between 1960 and 1970 et
cetera. Their exact year of birth is unknown to us, but at least we now know for sure in
which decade they are born. We introduce a simple and concrete motivating instance
of coarse data with the following example.
IThis work is adapted from dissertation [1, Chapters 6 and 7], which extends MSc. thesis [2].
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Example A (Fair die). Suppose I throw a fair die. I get to see the result of the throw,
but you do not. Now I tell you that the result lies in the set {1, 2, 3, 4}. This is an
example of coarse data. You know that I used a fair die and that what I tell you is true.
Now you are asked to give the probability that I rolled a 3. Likely, you would say that
the probability of each of the remaining possible results is 1/4. This is the knee-jerk
reaction of someone who studied probability theory, since this is standard conditioning.
But is this always correct?
Suppose that there is only one alternative set of results I could give you after rolling
the die, namely the set {3, 4, 5, 6}. I can now follow a coarsening mechanism: a pro-
cedure that tells me which subset to reveal given a particular result of the die roll. If
the outcome is 1, 2, 5, or 6, there is nothing for me to choose. Suppose that if the out-
come is 3 or 4, the coarsening mechanism I use selects set {1, 2, 3, 4} or set {3, 4, 5, 6}
at random, each with probability 1/2. If I throw the die 6000 times, I expect to see the
outcome 3 a thousand times. Therefore I expect to report the set {1, 2, 3, 4} five hun-
dred times after I see the outcome 3. It is clear that I expect to report the set {1, 2, 3, 4}
3000 times in total. So for die rolls where I told you {1, 2, 3, 4}, the probability of the
true outcome being 3 is actually 1/6 with this coarsening mechanism. We see that the
prediction of 1/4 from the first paragraph was not correct, in the sense that the prob-
abilities computed there do not correspond to the long-run relative frequencies. We
conclude that the knee-jerk reaction is not always correct.
In Example A we have seen that standard conditioning does not always give the
correct answers. Heitjan and Rubin [3] answer the question under what circumstances
standard conditioning of coarse data is correct. They discovered a necessary and suf-
ficient condition of the coarsening mechanism, called coarsening at random (CAR).
A coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR condition if, for each subset y of the out-
comes, the probability of choosing to report y is the same no matter which outcome
x ∈ y is the true outcome. It depends on the arrangement of possible revealed subsets
whether a coarsening mechanism exists that satisfies CAR. It holds automatically if the
subsets that can be revealed partition the sample space. As noted by Gru¨nwald and
Halpern [4] however, as soon as events overlap, there exist distributions on the space
for which CAR does not hold. In many such situations it even cannot hold; see Gill and
Gru¨nwald [5] for a complete characterization of the — quite restricted — set of situ-
ations in which CAR can hold. No coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR condition
for Example A.
We hasten to add that we neither question the validity of conditioning nor do we
want to replace it by something else. The real problem lies not with conditioning, but
with conditioning within the wrong sample space, in which the coarsening mechanism
cannot be represented. If we had a distribution P on the correct, larger space, which
allows for statements like ‘the probability is α that I choose {1, 2, 3, 4} to reveal if the
outcome is 3’, then conditioning would give the correct results. The problem with
coarse data is though that we often do not have enough information to identify P —
e.g. we do not know the value of α and do not want to assume that it is 1/2. Hence-
forth, we shall refer to conditioning in the overly simple space as ‘naive conditioning’.
In this paper we propose update rules for situations in which naive conditioning gives
the wrong answer, and conditioning in the right space is problematic because the un-
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derlying distribution is partially unknown. These are invariably situations in which two
or more of the potentially observed events overlap.
We illustrate this further with a famously counter-intuitive example: the Monty
Hall puzzle, posed by Selvin [6] and popularized years later in Ask Marilyn, a weekly
column in Parade Magazine by Marilyn vos Savant [7].
Example B (Monty Hall). Suppose you are on a game show and you may choose one
of three doors. Behind one of the doors a car can be found, but the other two only hide
a goat. Initially the car is equally likely to be behind each of the doors. After you have
picked one of the doors, the host Monty Hall, who knows the location of the prize, will
open one of the other doors, revealing a goat. Now you are asked if you would like to
switch from the door you chose to the other unopened door. Is it a good idea to switch?
At this moment we will not answer this question, but we show that the problem
of choosing whether to switch doors is an example of the coarse data problem. The
unknown random value we are interested in is the location of the car: one of the three
doors. When the host opens a door different from the one you picked, revealing a goat,
this is equivalent to reporting a subset. The subset he reports is the set of the two doors
that are still closed. For example, if he opens door 2, this tells us that the true value,
the location of the car, is in the subset {1, 3}. Note that if you have by chance picked
the correct door, there are two possible doors Monty Hall can open, so also two subsets
he can report. This implies that Monty has a choice in reporting a subset. How does
Monty’s coarsening mechanism influence your prediction of the true location of the
car?
The CAR condition can only be satisfied for very particular distributions of where
the prize is: the probability that the prize is hidden behind the initially chosen door
must be either 0 or 1, otherwise no CAR coarsening mechanism exists [4, Example
3.3]1. If the prize is hidden in any other way, for example uniformly at random as
we assume, then CAR cannot hold, and naive conditioning will result in an incorrect
conclusion for at least one of the two subsets.
Examples A and B are just two instances of a more general problem: the number of
outcomes may be arbitrary; the initial distribution of the true outcome may be any dis-
tribution; and the subsets of outcomes that may be reported to the decision maker may
be any family of sets. Our goal is to define general procedures that tell us how to update
the probabilities of the outcomes after making a coarse observation, in such situations
where naive conditioning is not adequate. We are aiming for modular methods that do
not enforce a particular interpretation of probability. In Example A, we saw “object-
ive” probabilities: the original distributions were known, and the updated probabilities
we found could again be interpreted as frequencies over many repetitions of the same
experiment. The original distribution of the outcomes could however also express a
subjective prior belief of how likely each outcome is. For example, in Example B, the
uniform distribution of the location of the car requires an assumption on the frequent-
1This uses the weak version of CAR in the terminology of Jaeger [8], in which outcomes with probability
0 are exempt from the equality constraint. A strong CAR coarsening mechanism does not exist regardless of
the probabilities with which the prize is hidden.
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ist’s part, while it may be a reasonable choice of prior for a subjective Bayesian [9].
In this case, the updated probabilities after a coarse observation take the role of the
Bayesian posterior distribution. In any case, we will refer to the initial probability of
an outcome, regardless of observations, as the marginal probability.
Without any assumptions on the quizmaster’s strategy (i.e. the coarsening mech-
anism), the conditional distributions of outcomes given observations will be unknown,
and this uncertainty cannot be fully expressed by a single probability distribution over
the outcomes. One way to deal with this is by means of imprecise probability, i.e. by
explicitly tracking all possible quizmaster strategies and their effects [10]. We however
focus on obtaining a single (precise) updated probability. To get such a single answer,
we could make some assumption about how the quizmaster chooses his strategy. As-
suming that the coarsening mechanism satisfies CAR is one such approach, but as we
saw in the two examples, there are scenarios where this assumption cannot hold. We
instead take a worst-case approach, treating the coarsening of the observation and the
subsequent probability update as a game between two players: the quizmaster and the
contestant (named for their roles in the Monty Hall scenario). The subset of outcomes
communicated by the quizmaster to the contestant will be called the message.
In this fictional game, the quizmaster’s goal is the opposite of the contestant’s,
namely to make predicting the true outcome as hard as possible for the contestant. This
type of zero-sum game, in which some information is revealed to the contestant was
also considered by Gru¨nwald and Halpern [11] and Ozdenoren and Peck [12]. Such
situations are rare in practice: The sender of a message might be motivated by interests
other than informing us (for example, a newspaper may be trying to optimize its sales
figures, or a company may want to present its performance in the best light), but rarely
by trying to be as uninformative as possible (though see Section 5.5, where we consider
the case that the players’ goals are not diametrically opposed). In other situations, the
‘sender’ might not be a rational being at all, but just some unknown process. Yet
this game is a useful way to look at the problem of updating our probabilities even
if we do not believe that the coarsening mechanism is chosen adversarially: if we
simply do not know how ‘nature’ chooses which message to give us and do not want to
make any assumptions about this, then choosing the worst-case (or minimax) optimal
probability update as defined here guarantees that we incur at most some fixed expected
loss, while any other probability update may lead to a larger expected loss depending
on the unknown coarsening mechanism. While from a Bayesian point of view, such a
choice might at first seem overly pessimistic, we note that in all cases we consider, our
approach is fully consistent with a Bayesian one — our results can be interpreted as
recommending a certain prior on the quizmaster’s assignment of messages to outcomes,
which in simple cases (such as Monty Hall) coincides with a prior that Bayesians would
be tempted to adopt as well.
We will employ a loss function to measure how well the quizmaster and the contest-
ant are doing at this game. Our results apply to a wide variety of loss functions. For an
analysis of the Monty Hall game, 0-1 loss would be appropriate, as the contestant must
choose a single door; this is the approach used by Gill [9] and Gnedin [13]. Other loss
functions, such as logarithmic loss and Brier loss (see e.g. Gru¨nwald and Dawid [14]),
also allow the contestant to formulate their prediction of where the prize is hidden as
an arbitrary probability distribution over the outcomes.
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We model probability updating as a game as follows. An outcome x is drawn with
known marginal probability px and shown to the quizmaster, who picks a consistent
message y 3 x using his coarsening mechanism P(y | x). Seeing only y, the contestant
makes a prediction in the form of a probability mass function Q(· | y) on outcomes.
Then x is revealed and the prediction quality measured using the loss function L. The
quizmaster/contestant aim to maximize/minimize the expected loss∑
x
px
∑
y3x
P(y | x)L(x,Q(· | y)). (1)
For the Monty Hall game with logarithmic or Brier, i.e. squared loss, the worst-case
optimal answer for the contestant is to put probability 1/3 on his initially chosen door
and 2/3 on the other door. (These probabilities agree with the literature on the Monty
Hall game.) Surprisingly, we will see (in Example D on page 17) that for very similar
games, logarithmic and Brier loss may lead to two different answers!
We will find that for finite outcome spaces, both players in our game have worst-
case optimal strategies for many loss functions: the quizmaster has a strategy that
makes the contestant’s prediction task as hard as possible, and the contestant has a strat-
egy that is guaranteed to give good predictions no matter how the quizmaster coarsens.
We give characterizations that allow us to recognize such strategies, for different con-
ditions on the loss functions.
Example A (continued). For logarithmic loss, the worst-case optimal prediction of
the die roll conditional on the revealed subset is found with the help of Theorem 10.
The worst-case optimal prediction given that you observe the set {1, 2, 3, 4} is: predict
outcomes 1 and 2 each with probability 1/3, and predict 3 and 4 each with probability
1/6. Symmetrically, given that you observe the set {3, 4, 5, 6}, the worst-case optimal
prediction is: 3 and 4 with probability 1/6, and 5 and 6 with probability 1/3.
These probabilities correspond with the uniform coarsening mechanism given ear-
lier. However, it is a good prediction even if you do not know what coarsening mech-
anism I am using. An intuitive argument for this is the following: If I wanted, I could
use a very extreme coarsening mechanism, always choosing to reveal the set {1, 2, 3, 4}
when the die comes up 3 or 4. But this is balanced by the possibility that I might be us-
ing the opposite coarsening mechanism, which always reveals {3, 4, 5, 6} if the result is
3 or 4. The worst-case optimal prediction given above hedges against both possibilities.
1.1. Overview of contents
In Section 2, we will give a precise definition of the ‘conditioning game’ we de-
scribed. In Section 3, we find general conditions on the loss function under which
worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and contestant exist, and we charac-
terize such strategies. (See Figure 3 for a visual illustration of the concepts used in
this section.) If stronger conditions hold, worst-case optimal strategies for both play-
ers may be easier to recognize. This is explored for two classes of loss functions in
Section 4; in particular, we find that for local proper loss functions (among which loga-
rithmic loss), worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by a
simple condition on their probabilities that we call the RCAR (reverse CAR) condition.
RCAR bears a striking similarity to CAR, but with the roles of outcomes and messages
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graph or matroid Y,
symmetric L
any Y,
local and proper L
RCAR
Figure 1: Classes of games for which the RCAR condition characterizes optimality. Y
is the set of messages and L is the loss function.
interchanged. Also, by Lemma 14, if a betting game is played repeatedly and the con-
testant is allowed to distribute investments over different outcomes and to reinvest all
capital gained so far in each round, then the same strategy is optimal, regardless of the
pay-offs! An overview of the theorems and the conditions under which they apply is
given in Table 1 on page 13.
Then in Section 5 we look at the influence of the set of available messages, im-
posing only the minimal symmetry requirement on the loss function. We prove that
for graph and matroid games (and only these) the optimality condition is again RCAR.
As RCAR is independent of the loss function, for such games probability updating
can hence be meaningfully defined and performed completely agnostic of the task at
hand. Many examples are included to illustrate (the limits of) the theoretical results.
Section 6 gives some concluding remarks. An overview of the results in this work is
presented in Figure 1. All proofs are given in Appendix A.
Highlight. A central feature of probability distributions is that they summarize what
a decision maker would do under a variety of circumstances (loss functions): for each
particular loss function the decision maker minimizes expected loss (maximizes util-
ity) using the same distribution no matter what specific loss function is used. Since we
generalize conditioning by using a minimax approach, one might expect that for differ-
ent loss functions one ends up with different updated probabilities. Still, we show that
for a rich selection of scenarios optimality is characterized by the RCAR condition,
which is independent of the loss function. As a result, our updated probabilities are
application-independent, and we may hence think of them — if we are willing to take
a cautious (minimax) approach — as expressing what an experimenter should believe
after having received the data.
We isolate two distinct classes of scenarios where such application independence
obtains. First, games with graph and matroid message sets (extending Monty Hall) and
symmetric loss functions. Second, graphs with arbitrary message sets and proper local
loss functions, including the symmetric logarithmic loss as well as its asymmetric gen-
eralizations appropriate for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs. In these scenarios
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our application-independent update rule has an objective appeal, and we feel that its
importance may transcend that of being “merely” minimax optimal.
This work is an extension of Feenstra [2] to loss functions other than logarithmic loss,
and to the case where the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster assigns prob-
ability 0 to some combinations of outcomes x and messages y with x ∈ y. It can also be
seen as a concrete application of the ideas in Gru¨nwald and Dawid [14] about minimax
optimal decision making and its relation to entropy. A more extensive discussion of
worst-case optimal probability updating can be found in Van Ommen [1]; in particular,
there the question of efficient algorithms for determining worst-case optimal strategies
is also considered.
2. Definitions and problem formulation
A (probability updating) game G is defined as a quadruple (X,Y, p, L), where X
is a finite set, Y is a family of distinct subsets of X with ⋃y∈Y y = X, p is a strictly
positive probability mass function onX, and L is a function L : X×∆X → [0,∞], where
∆X is the set of all probability mass functions on X. We call X the outcome space, Y
the message structure, p the marginal distribution, and L the loss function. It is clear
that outcomes with zero marginal probability p do not contribute to the objective (1),
so we may exclude them without loss of generality. Let us illustrate these definitions
by applying them to our example.
Example B (continued). We assume the car is hidden uniformly at random behind
one of the three doors. With this assumption, we can abstract away the initial choice of
a door by the contestant: by symmetry, we can assume without loss of generality that
he always picks door 2. Then the probability updating game starts with the quizmaster
opening door 1 or 3, thereby giving the message “the car is behind door 2 or 3” or
“the car is behind door 1 or 2”, respectively. This can be expressed as follows in our
formalization:
• outcome space X = {x1, x2, x3};
• message space Y = {y1, y2} with y1 = {x1, x2} and y2 = {x2, x3};
• marginal distribution p uniform on X.
If a loss function L is also given, this fully specifies a game. One example is random-
ized 0-1 loss, which is given by L(x,Q) = 1−Q(x). Here x is the true outcome, and Q is
the contestant’s prediction of the true outcome in the form of a probability distribution.
Thus the prediction Q is awarded a smaller loss if it assigned a larger probability Q(x)
to the outcome x that actually obtained. We will see other examples of loss functions
in Section 2.2.
A function from some finite set S to the reals R = (−∞,∞) corresponds to an |S |-
dimensional vector when we fix an order on the elements of S . We write RS for the set
of such functions/vectors. Even if no order on S is specified, this allows us to apply
concepts from linear algebra to RS without ambiguity. For example, we may say that
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some set is an affine subspace of RS . (This identification and the resulting notation are
also used by Schrijver [15].)
Using this correspondence, we identify the elements of ∆X with the |X|-dimensional
vectors in the unit simplex, though we use ordinary function notation P(x) for its ele-
ments. The probability mass function p that is part of a game’s definition is also a
vector in ∆X. Vector notation px will be used to refer to its elements to set p apart from
P, which will denote distributions chosen by the quizmaster rather than fixed by the
game.
For any message y ⊆ X, we define ∆y = {P ∈ ∆X | P(x) = 0 for x < y}. Note
that these are vectors of the same length as those in ∆X, though contained within a
lower-dimensional affine subspace.
A loss function L is called proper if P ∈ arg minQ∈∆X EX∼P L(X,Q) for all P ∈
∆X, and strictly proper if this minimizer is unique (this is standard terminology; see
for instance Gneiting and Raftery [16]). Thus if a predicting agent believes the true
distribution of an outcome to be given by some P, such a loss function will encourage
him to report Q = P as his prediction.
2.1. Strategies
Strategies for the players are specified by conditional distributions: a strategy P
for the quizmaster consists of distributions on Y, one for each possible x ∈ X, and a
strategy Q for the contestant consists of distributions on X, one for each possible y ∈
Y. These strategies define how the two players act in any situation: the quizmaster’s
strategy defines how he chooses a message containing the true outcome (the coarsening
mechanism), and the contestant’s strategy defines his prediction for each message he
might receive.
We write P(· | x) for the distribution on Y the quizmaster plays when the true
outcome is x ∈ X. Because px > 0, this conditional distribution can be recovered from
the joint P(x, y) := P(y | x)px; we will use this joint distribution to specify a strategy
for the quizmaster. If P(y) :=
∑
x∈y P(x, y) > 0, we may also write P(· | y) for the vector
in ∆y given by P(x | y) := P(x, y)/P(y). No such rewrites can be made for Q, as no
marginal Q(y) is specified by the game or by the strategy Q. To shorten notation and
to emphasize that Q is not a joint distribution, we write Q|y rather than Q(· | y) for the
distribution that the contestant plays in response to message y.
We restrict the quizmaster to conditional distributions P for which P(y | x) = 0 if
x < y; that is, he may not ‘lie’ to the contestant. We make no similar requirement on
the contestant’s choice of Q, though for proper loss functions, and in fact all other loss
functions we will consider in our examples, the contestant can gain nothing from using
a strategy Q for which Q|y(x) > 0 where x < y.
P x1 x2 x3
y1 1/3 1/6 −
y2 − 1/6 1/3
px 1/3 1/3 1/3
(2)
Example B (continued). The table to the right spe-
cifies all aspects of a game except for its loss function:
its outcome space (here, for the Monty Hall game,
X = {x1, x2, x3}), message space (Y = {y1, y2} with
y1 = {x1, x2} and y2 = {x2, x3}) and marginal distribu-
tion (p uniform on X). In this table we have filled in a strategy P for the quizmaster in
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the form of a joint distribution on pairs of x and y. The cells in the table where x < y
are marked with a dash to indicate that P may not assign positive probability there.
The probabilities in each column sum to the marginal probabilities at the bottom, so
this joint distribution P has the correct marginal distribution on the outcomes. For this
particular strategy, if the true outcome is x2, the quizmaster will give message y1 or y2
to the contestant with equal probability.
More formally, write R(X,Y) as an abbreviation for the set of pairs {(x, y) | y ∈
Y, x ∈ y}. In the case of the Monty Hall game, there are four such pairs: R(X,Y) =
{(x1, y1), (x2, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y2)}. The notation RR(X,Y)≥0 represents the set of all func-
tions from R(X,Y) to R≥0. If P is an element of this set and (x, y) ∈ R(X,Y), the value
of P at (x, y) is denoted by P(x, y). For (x, y) with x < y, the notation P(x, y) does not
correspond to a value of the function, but is taken to be 0.
We again identify the elements of RR(X,Y)≥0 with vectors. Thus the mass function P
shown in (2) is identified with a four-element vector (1/3, 1/6, 1/6, 1/3). (We could have
chosen a different ordering instead.)
We define the set P of strategies for the quizmaster as {P ∈ RR(X,Y)≥0 |
∑
y3x P(x, y) =
px for all x}; this is a convex set. The set of strategies for the contestant is Q := ∆YX ={(Q|y)y∈Y | Q|y ∈ ∆X for each y ∈ Y}.
For given strategies P and Q, the expected loss the contestant incurs (1) is∑
x∈X
px
∑
y∈Y:x∈y
P(y | x)L(x,Q|y) = EX∼p EY∼P(·|X) L(X,Q|Y ) = E(X,Y)∼P L(X,Q|Y ). (3)
We allow L to take the value ∞; if this value occurs with positive probability, then the
contestant’s expected loss is infinite. However, for terms where the probability is zero,
we define 0 · ∞ = 0, as is consistent with measure-theoretic probability.
We model the probability updating problem as a zero-sum game between two play-
ers with objective (3): the quizmaster chooses P ∈ P to maximize (3), while simul-
taneously (that is, without knowing P) the contestant chooses Q ∈ Q to minimize that
quantity. The game (X,Y, p, L) is common knowledge for the two players.
If the contestant knew the quizmaster’s strategy, he would pick a strategy Q that
for each y minimizes the expected loss of predicting x given y. When the contestant
receives a message and knows the distribution P ∈ ∆X over the outcomes given that
message, this expected loss is written as
HL(P) := inf
Q∈∆X
∑
x
P(x)L(x,Q) = inf
Q∈∆X
EX∼P L(X,Q). (4)
This is the generalized entropy of P for loss function L [14]. (Note that in the preceding
display, P and Q are not strategies but simply distributions over X.) If the contestant
picks his strategy Q this way, (3) becomes the expected generalized entropy of the
quizmaster’s strategy P ∈ P: ∑
y∈Y
P(y)HL(P(· | y)), (5)
where we again define terms with P(y) = 0 as 0. We say a strategy P is worst-case
optimal for the quizmaster if it maximizes this expected generalized entropy over all
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P ∈ P. We call the version of the game where the quizmaster has to play first the
maximin game, where the order of the words ‘max’ and ‘min’ reflects the order in
which they appear in the expression for the value of this game as well as the order in
which the maximizing and minimizing players take their turns.
Similarly, if the contestant were to play first (the minimax game), his goal might be
to find a strategy Q that minimizes his worst-case expected loss
max
P∈P
∑
x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y) = max
P∈P
E(X,Y)∼P L(X,Q|Y ). (6)
(In this case, the maximum is always achieved so we can write max rather than sup:
for each x, the quizmaster can choose P that puts all mass on a y 3 x with the max-
imum loss.) We call a strategy worst-case optimal for the contestant if it achieves the
minimum of (6).
It is an elementary result from game theory that if worst-case optimal strategies P∗
and Q∗ exist for the two players, their expected losses are related by∑
y∈Y
P∗(y)HL(P∗(· | y)) ≤ max
P∈P
∑
x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q∗|y) (7)
[17, Lemma 36.1: “maximin ≤ minimax”]. The inequality expresses that in a sequen-
tial game where one of the players knows the other’s strategy before choosing his own,
the player to move second may have an advantage.
In the next section, we will see that in many probability updating games, worst-case
optimal strategies for both players exist (but may not be unique), and the maximum
expected generalized entropy equals the minimum worst-case expected loss:∑
y∈Y
P∗(y)HL(P∗(· | y)) = max
P∈P
∑
x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q∗|y). (8)
When this is the case, we say that the minimax theorem holds [18, 19]. We remark
here that our setting, while a zero-sum game, differs from the usual setting of zero-sum
games in some respects: We consider possibly infinite loss and (in general) infinite sets
of strategies available to the players, but do not allow the players to randomize over
these strategies. Randomizing over P would not give the quizmaster an advantage,
as P is convex and he could just play the corresponding convex combination directly;
because (3) is linear in P, this results in the same expected loss. (Another way to view
this is that, essentially, the quizmaster is randomizing, over a finite set of strategies.)
For the contestant, Q is also convex, but in general (depending on L), playing a convex
combination of strategies does not correspond to randomizing over those strategies.
The two do correspond in the case of randomized 0-1 loss, where L is linear. If L is
convex, then playing the convex combination is at least as good for him as randomizing
(and if L is strictly convex, better), so allowing randomization would again not give an
advantage.
When (8) holds, any pair of worst-case optimal strategies (P∗,Q∗) forms a (pure
strategy) Nash equilibrium, a concept introduced by Nash [20]: neither player can
benefit from deviating from their worst-case optimal strategy if the other player leaves
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his strategy unchanged. This means that the definitions of worst-case optimality given
above are also meaningful in the game we are actually interested in, where the players
move simultaneously in the sense that neither knows the other’s strategy when choosing
his own.
2.2. Three standard loss functions
Three commonly used loss functions are logarithmic loss, Brier loss, and random-
ized 0-1 loss. These are defined as follows [14]:
Logarithmic loss is a strictly proper loss function, given by
L(x,Q) = − log Q(x).
Its entropy is the Shannon entropy HL(P) =
∑
x −P(x) log P(x). The functions L and HL
are displayed in Figure 2a for the case of a binary prediction (i.e. a prediction between
two possible outcomes). The (three-dimensional) graph of HL for the case of three
outcomes will appear in Figure 3 on page 16.
Brier loss is another strictly proper loss function, corresponding to squared Euc-
lidean distance:
L(x,Q) =
∑
x′∈X
(
1x′=x − Q(x′))2 = (1 − Q(x))2 + ∑
x′∈X,x′,x
Q(x′)2.
Its entropy function is HL(P) = 1−∑x∈X P(x)2; L and HL are displayed in Figure 2b for
a binary prediction. Note that for 3 outcomes and beyond, the Brier loss on outcome x
is not simply a function of Q(x), it depends on the entire distribution Q.
The third loss function we will often refer to is randomized 0-1 loss, given by
L(x,Q) = 1 − Q(x).
It is improper: an optimal response Q to some distribution P puts all mass on out-
come(s) with maximum P(x). Its entropy function is HL(P) = 1 − maxx∈X P(x) (see
Figure 2c). It is related to hard 0-1 loss, which requires the contestant to pick a single
outcome x′ and gives loss 0 if x′ = x and 1 otherwise. Randomized 0-1 loss essentially
allows the contestant to randomize his prediction: L(x,Q) equals the expected value of
hard 0-1 loss when x′ is distributed according to Q. An important difference between
games with hard and randomized 0-1 loss will be shown later in Example F.
2.3. On duplicate messages and outcomes
Our definition of a game rules out duplicate messages inY, which would not mean-
ingfully change the options of either player as the two messages represent the same
move for the quizmaster; this will be made precise in Lemma 2. The definition does
allow duplicate outcomes: pairs of outcomes x1, x2 ∈ X such that x1 ∈ y if and only if
x2 ∈ y for all y ∈ Y. We will see later (in Example D) that games with such outcomes
cannot generally be solved in terms of games without, and thus we must analyse them
in their own right.
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(a) Logarithmic loss (natural base)
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
1.5
2
Q(x)
L(x
, Q
)
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
P(x)
e
n
tro
py
(b) Brier loss
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
Q(x)
L(x
, Q
)
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
P(x)
e
n
tro
py
(c) Randomized 0-1 loss
Figure 2: Three standard loss functions on a binary prediction. The left figures show
the loss L(x,Q) when probability Q(x) is assigned to true outcome x ∈ {0, 1}. The right
figures show the entropy HL(P).
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Table 1: Results on worst-case optimal strategies for different loss functions
Conditions on L Results Example
HL finite and continuous P∗ exists and is characterized by The-
orem 3
hard 0-1 loss
HL finite and continuous;
all minimal supporting
hyperplanes realizable
Q∗ exists and a Nash equilibrium exists
by Theorem 5; Q∗ characterized by The-
orem 7
randomized
0-1 loss
L proper and continuous;
HL finite and continuous
all the above simplified by Theorem 9 Brier loss
L local and proper;
HL finite and continuous
characterization of P∗ simplified further
by Theorem 10 (RCAR condition)
logarithmic
loss
3. Worst-case optimal strategies
In this section, we present characterization theorems that allow worst-case optimal
strategies for the quizmaster and contestant to be recognized for a large class of loss
functions. In order to be applicable to a wide range of loss functions, this section is
rather technical, and the characterizations of worst-case optimal strategies we find here
are not always easy to use (though the abstract results in these sections are illustrated by
concrete examples in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.3). We will find simpler characterizations
for smaller classes of loss functions in Section 4. An overview of these results is given
in Table 1.
We will need the following properties of HL throughout our theory:
Lemma 1. For all loss functions L, if HL is finite, then it is also concave and lower
semi-continuous. If L is finite everywhere, then HL is finite, concave, and continuous.
(When we talk about (semi-)continuity, this is always with respect to the extended
real line topology of losses, as in Rockafellar [17, Section 7].)
3.1. Worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster
We start by studying the probability updating game from the perspective of the
quizmaster. Using just the concavity of the quizmaster’s objective (5) (which is a linear
combination of concave generalized entropies), we can prove the following intuitive
result.
Lemma 2 (Message subsumption). Suppose that for P ∈ P there are two messages
y1, y2 ∈ Y such that any outcome x ∈ y2 with P(x, y2) > 0 is also in y1. Then if HL is
concave, the quizmaster can do at least as well without using y2. More precisely, P′
13
given by
P′(x, y) =

P(x, y1) + P(x, y2) for y = y1;
0 for y = y2;
P(x, y) otherwise.
is also in P and its expected generalized entropy is at least as large as that of P. In
particular, if P is worst-case optimal, then so is P′.
In particular, if y1 ⊃ y2, any strategy P can be replaced by a strategy P′ with
P′(y2) = 0 without making things worse for the quizmaster. Thus the quizmaster, who
wants to maximize the contestant’s expected loss, never needs to use a message that is
contained in another.
A dominating hyperplane to a function f from D ⊆ RX to R is a hyperplane in
RX × R that is nowhere below f . A supporting hyperplane to f (at P) is a domin-
ating hyperplane that touches f at some point P.2 A concave function has at least
one supporting hyperplane at every point [17, Theorem 11.6], but it may be ver-
tical. A nonvertical hyperplane can be described by a linear function ` : RX → R:
`(P) = α +
∑
x P(x)λx, where α ∈ R and λ ∈ RX.
While HL is defined as a function on ∆X, we will often need to talk about supporting
hyperplanes to the function HL restricted to ∆y for some message y ∈ Y. We use the
notation HL  ∆y for the restriction of HL to the domain ∆y. (Recall that we defined ∆y
as a subset of ∆X.) A supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y is not a supporting hyperplane
to HL itself if it goes below HL at some P ∈ ∆X \ ∆y.
A supergradient is a generalization of the gradient: a supergradient of a concave
function at a point is the gradient of a supporting hyperplane. If HL  ∆y is finite and
continuous (and thus concave by Lemma 1), then for any vector λ ∈ RX, a unique
supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y can be found having that vector as its gradient,
by choosing α appropriately in `(P) = α +
∑
x P(x)λx [17, Theorem 27.3]. It will
often be convenient in our discussion to talk about supporting hyperplanes rather than
supergradients because they fix this choice of α.
Theorem 3 (Existence and characterization of P∗). For HL finite and upper semi-
continuous (thus continuous), a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster (that
is, a P ∈ P maximizing (5)) exists, and P∗ is such a strategy if and only if there exists a
λ∗ ∈ RX such that
HL(P′) ≤
∑
x∈y
P′(x)λ∗x for all y ∈ Y and P′ ∈ ∆y,
with equality if P∗(y) > 0 and P′ = P∗(· | y). That is, for y with P∗(y) > 0, the linear
function
∑
x∈y P(x)λ∗x defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P∗(· | y), and a
dominating hyperplane for other y.
A vector λ∗ ∈ RX that satisfies the above for some worst-case optimal P∗ satisfies
it for all worst-case optimal P∗ and is called a Kuhn-Tucker vector (or KT-vector).
2We deviate slightly from standard terminology here: what we call a supporting hyperplane to a concave
function f is usually called a supporting hyperplane to {(u, v) ∈ RX × R | v ≤ f (u)}, the hypograph of f .
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Section 3.1.1 includes several examples illustrating the application of Theorem 3;
a graphical illustration of the theorem is also included there (Figure 3). We will see in
Section 3.2 that KT-vectors form the bridge between worst-case optimal strategies for
the quizmaster and for the contestant.
3.1.1. Application to standard loss functions
The generalized entropy for logarithmic loss has only vertical supporting hyper-
planes at the boundary of ∆y for any y ∈ Y. These hyperplanes do not correspond
to any KT-vector λ∗ ∈ RX, from which it follows that for any y with P∗(y) > 0, the
worst-case optimal strategy will not have P∗(· | y) at the boundary of ∆y. The same is
not generally true: we will see below how for randomized 0-1 loss (in Example B on
page 15, and Example D) and Brier loss (in Example E), games may have a worst-case
optimal strategy for the quizmaster that has P∗(y) > 0, yet P∗(x | y) = 0 for some
y ∈ Y, x ∈ y.
Of the three loss functions we saw earlier, Brier loss and 0-1 loss are finite, so
by Lemma 1, all conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied for them. Logarithmic loss is
infinite when the obtained outcome was predicted to have probability zero. The gener-
alized entropy is still finite, because for any true distribution P, there exist predictions
Q that give finite expected loss (in particular, Q = P does this). The entropy is also
continuous: −P(x) log P(x) is continuous as a function of P(x) with our convention
that 0 · ∞ = 0, and HL is the sum of such continuous functions. Thus we can apply
Theorem 3 to analyse the Monty Hall problem for each of these three loss functions.
Example B (continued). For Monty Hall, the strategy P∗ of choosing a message uni-
formly when the true outcome is x2 is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, for all
three loss functions. It is easy to verify that the theorem is satisfied by this strategy
combined with the appropriate KT-vector:
for logarithmic loss: λ∗ =
(
− log 2
3
,− log 1
3
,− log 2
3
)
;
for Brier loss: λ∗ =
(
2
9
,
8
9
,
2
9
)
;
for randomized 0-1 loss: λ∗ = (0, 1, 0).
The situation for logarithmic loss is illustrated in Figure 3.
We also find that for logarithmic loss and Brier loss, P∗ is the unique worst-case
optimal strategy, as the hyperplanes specified by λ∗ touch the generalized entropy func-
tions at only one point each. For randomized 0-1 loss, on the other hand, all quizmaster
strategies are worst-case optimal, as the hyperplane specified by λ∗ touches HL  ∆y1
at all P(· | y1) with P(x1 | y1) ≥ 1/2.
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λ∗x1
λ∗x2
λ∗x3
P∗(· | y1) P∗(· | y2)
x1
x2
x3
∆y1 ∆y2
∆X
Figure 3: The worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster in the Monty Hall game
with logarithmic loss, as characterized by Theorem 3. The triangular base is the full
simplex ∆X, on which the entropy function HL is defined (this is the grey dome); the
points labelled x1, x2 and x3 are the elements of this simplex putting all mass on that
single outcome; and the line segments ∆y1 and ∆y2 are the subsets of ∆X consisting of
all distributions supported on y1 and y2 respectively. Restricted to the domain ∆y1 , the
vector λ∗ defines a linear function (having height λ∗x at each x ∈ X) that is a supporting
hyperplane to HL at P∗(· | y1) (and similar for y2). Note that when the linear function
defined by λ∗ is extended to all of ∆X, it may go below HL there, but not in ∆y1 or ∆y2 .
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P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 1/5 1/5 − −
y2 − 0 0 −
y3 − − 1/5 2/5
px 1/5 1/5 1/5 2/5
Example C (The quizmaster discards a message).
Consider a different game, with X = {x1, x2, x3, x4},
Y = {{x1, x2}, {x2, x3}, {x3, x4}}, p given by px4 = 2/5
and px = 1/5 elsewhere, and L logarithmic loss. In
the terminology of the Monty Hall puzzle, there is no
initial choice by the contestant that determines what
moves are available to the quizmaster, but the quizmaster will again leave two doors
closed: the one hiding the car, and another adjacent to it. Then one strategy for the quiz-
master is to never give message y2 to the contestant; i.e. to pick the strategy P ∈ P with
P(y2) = 0 shown to the right. The depicted strategy P is worst-case optimal: When
applying the theorem, we see that the KT-vector λ∗ = (log 2, log 2, log 3,− log(2/3))
gives supporting hyperplanes to HL  ∆y1 and HL  ∆y3 , but a non-supporting domin-
ating hyperplane to HL  ∆y2 . This strategy can be seen to be intuitively reasonable
because when the contestant receives message y3 = {x3, x4}, he knows that the prob-
ability of the true outcome being x4 is at least twice as large as the probability of it
being x3. By always giving message y3 when the true outcome is x3, the quizmaster
can keep this difference from becoming larger.
P is also the unique worst-case optimal strategy for Brier loss (as shown by the same
analysis) and for randomized 0-1 loss (where the KT-vector is not unique: (a, 1−a, 1, 0)
for any a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector).
In the previous examples, the worst-case optimal strategies P coincided for loga-
rithmic and Brier loss. The following example shows that this is not always the case.
P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 1/3 1/6 − −
y2 − 1/6 1/6 1/6
px 1/3 1/3 1/6 1/6
Example D (Dependence on loss function). Consider
the family of games with X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, Y =
{{x1, x2}, {x2, x3, x4}}, px1 = px2 = 1/3, and px3 =
px4 = 1/6: This game is also similar to Monty Hall,
but now one door has been ‘split in two’: the quiz-
master will either open door 1, or doors 3 and 4. The
strategy P shown to the right is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss, but not for
Brier loss: for both loss functions, there is a unique supporting hyperplane for both y
that touches HL  ∆y at P(· | y) for P as shown in the table, but for Brier loss, these
two hyperplanes do not have the same height at the common outcome x2. (Using The-
orem 9 from page 22, we can find the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster
under Brier loss by solving a quadratic equation with one unknown; this strategy has
P(x2, y1) = 11/3 − 2
√
3 ≈ 0.20 and P(x2, y2) = 2
√
3 − 10/3 ≈ 0.13.)
For randomized 0-1 loss, neither the worst-case optimal strategy nor the KT-vector
are unique: the KT-vectors are (0, 1, a, 1 − a) for any a ∈ [0, 1]; the worst-case optimal
strategies are the P given above, the strategy that always gives message y1 when the
true outcome is x2, and all convex combinations of these.
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P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 0.45 0.05 − −
y2 − 0 0.25 0.25
px 0.45 0.05 0.25 0.25
Example E (The quizmaster discards a mes-
sage-outcome pair). Again consider the game from
the previous example, but now with a different mar-
ginal as shown to the right. The strategy P is worst-
case optimal for Brier loss, with KT-vector
λ∗ = (0.02, 1.62, 0.5, 0.5).
P displays another curious property (that we also saw for randomized 0-1 loss in the
previous example): while the quizmaster uses message y2 for some outcomes, he does
not use it in combination with outcome x2. In the theorem, the hyperplane on ∆y2 is
supporting at P(· | y2), but is not a tangent plane: compared to the tangent plane, it has
been ‘lifted up’ at the opposite vertex of the simplex ∆y2 (x2) to the same height as the
supporting hyperplane on ∆y1 .
This behaviour cannot occur in games with logarithmic loss: as we observed at the
beginning of Section 3.1.1, if a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ has P∗(y) > 0 for some
y ∈ Y, then it must assign positive probability to P∗(x | y) for all x ∈ y.
3.2. Worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant
We now turn our attention to worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant. To
this end, we look at the relation between the KT-vectors that appeared in Theorem 3
and the set of strategies Q the contestant can choose from.
3.2.1. Realizable hyperplanes
For any y ∈ Y, ∆y is defined in Section 2 as a (|y| − 1)-dimensional subset of RX≥0.
Thus a linear function ` : ∆y → R can be extended to a linear function ¯` on the domain
RX≥0 in different ways. Hence many different vectors λ ∈ RX representing supporting
hyperplanes will correspond to what we can view as a single supergradient, because
the hyperplanes agree on ∆y. We can make the extension unique by requiring ¯` to be
zero at the origin and at the vertices of the simplex ∆X\y. Because such a normalized
function ¯` : RX≥0 → R obeys ¯`(0) = 0, it can be written as ¯`(P) = P>λ for some λ.
These functions are thus uniquely identified by their gradients λ, allowing us to refer to
them using ‘the (supporting) hyperplane λ’. Let Λy be the set of all gradients of such
normalized functions that represent dominating hyperplanes to HL  ∆y; in formula, let
Λy = {λ ∈ RX | λx = 0 for x < y, and ∀P ∈ ∆y : P>λ ≥ HL(P)}.
For each nonvertical supporting hyperplane of HL  ∆y, clearly the gradient is in Λy;
that is, all finite supergradients of this restricted function have a normalized represent-
ative in Λy. The set also includes vectors λ for which P>λ > HL(P) for all P ∈ ∆y,
which do not correspond to supporting hyperplanes.
Not all vectors λ ∈ Λy may be available to the contestant as responses to a play of
y ∈ Y by the quizmaster. As a trivial example, consider logarithmic loss and a vector λ
with
∑
x∈y e−λx < 1 and λx = 0 for x < y. Then λ ∈ Λy because the hyperplane defined
by λ is dominating to HL  ∆y (thus the expected loss from λ is larger than what the
contestant could achieve), but clearly there is no distribution Q ∈ ∆X that results in
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these losses on x ∈ y. We say that a vector λ ∈ Λy is realizable on y if there exists a
Q ∈ ∆X such that L(x,Q) = λx for all x ∈ y, and then we say that such a Q realizes λ.
A partial order on vectors λ, λ′ ∈ RX is given by: λ ≤ λ′ if and only if λx ≤ λ′x
for all x ∈ X. We write λ < λ′ when λ ≤ λ′ and λ , λ′. For all y ∈ Y, this partial
order has the following property: For λ, λ′ ∈ Λy, we have λ ≤ λ′ if and only if for
all P ∈ ∆y, P>λ ≤ P>λ′ (since any linear function is maximized over the simplex at
a vertex). Therefore if Q,Q′ ∈ ∆X realize λ, λ′ ∈ Λy respectively and λ ≤ λ′, the
contestant is never hurt by using Q instead of Q′ as a prediction given the message y.
Any minimal element with respect to this partial order defines a supporting hyper-
plane to HL  ∆y. For P in the relative interior of ∆y, the converse also holds: all
supporting hyperplanes at P are minimal elements. This is not the case for P at the
relative boundary of ∆y, where some supporting hyperplanes (the ones that ‘tip over’
the boundary) are not minimal.
Lemma 4. If HL is finite and continuous on ∆y, then the following hold:
1. If λ ∈ Λy is not a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y, then there exists a support-
ing hyperplane λ′ ∈ Λy with λ′ < λ;
2. If λ ∈ Λy is a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P but is not minimal in Λy,
then there exists a minimal λ′ < λ in Λy;
3. If λ ∈ Λy is a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P, then any λ′ ≤ λ in Λy is a
supporting hyperplane at P and obeys λ′x = λx for all x ∈ y with P(x) > 0.
Thus the contestant never needs to play a Q|y realizing a non-minimal element of
Λy.
3.2.2. Existence
With the help of Lemma 4, we can formulate sufficient conditions for the existence
of a worst-case optimal strategy Q∗ for the contestant that, together with P∗ for the
quizmaster, forms a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5 (Existence of Q∗). Suppose that HL is finite and continuous and that for all
y ∈ Y, all minimal supporting hyperplanes λ ∈ Λy to HL  ∆y are realizable on y. Then
there exists a worst-case optimal strategy Q∗ ∈ Q for the contestant that achieves the
same expected loss in the minimax game as P∗ achieves in the maximin game: (P∗,Q∗)
is a Nash equilibrium.
We will see in Theorem 9 that a (or rather, at least one) Nash equilibrium exists
for logarithmic loss and Brier loss. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with
randomized 0-1 loss is shown by the following consequence of Theorem 5.
Proposition 6. In games with randomized 0-1 loss, a Nash equilibrium exists.
The following example shows what may go wrong if some supporting hyperplanes
are not realizable.
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P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/6 1/6 −
y2 − 1/6 1/6
y3 1/6 − 1/6
px 1/3 1/3 1/3
Example F (Hard 0-1 loss). Consider the game with X, Y
and p as shown in the table, and with hard 0-1 loss (so that
the contestant is not allowed to randomize):
L(x,Q) =
0 if Q(x) = 1;1 otherwise.
This loss function has the same entropy function as randomized 0-1 loss, so the two
loss functions are the same from the quizmaster’s perspective. The table shows the
unique worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster, with KT-vector λ∗ = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2)
and expected loss 1/2. For randomized 0-1 loss, the (as we will see below: unique)
worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant would be to respond to any message y
with the uniform distribution on y. However, for all y ∈ Y, λ given by λx = 1x∈yλ∗x
is not realizable on y under hard 0-1 loss, so Theorem 5 does not apply. In fact, for
any strategy Q the contestant might use, there exists a strategy P for the quizmaster
that gives expected loss 2/3 or larger (because for at least two outcomes x, there must
be a y 3 x such that L(x,Q|y) = 1). Thus the inequality (7) is strict: there is no Nash
equilibrium, and a worst-case optimal strategy for either player is optimal only in the
minimax/maximin sense.
This example also shows that the condition on existence of supporting hyperplanes
in Theorem 5 cannot be replaced by the weaker condition that the infimum appearing
in the definition (4) of HL is always attained.
Games without Nash equilibria. We will now briefly go into the situation seen in the
preceding example, where Theorem 5 does not apply.
While for some games with L hard 0-1 loss, no Nash equilibrium may exist, worst-
case optimal strategies for the contestant do exist, and can be characterized using stable
sets of a graph. A stable set is a set of nodes no two of which are adjacent [21, Chapter
64]. Consider the graph with node set X and with an edge between two nodes if and
only if they occur together in some message. A set S ⊆ X is stable in this graph
if and only if there exists a strategy Q ∈ Q for the contestant such that for all x ∈ S ,
maxy∈Y:x∈y L(x,Q|y) = 0, and equal to 1 otherwise. The worst-case loss obtained by this
strategy is 1−∑x∈S px. Thus finding the worst-case optimal strategy Q for the contestant
is equivalent to finding a stable set S with maximum weight. Algorithmically, this is
an NP-hard problem in general, though polynomial-time algorithms exist for certain
classes of graphs, including perfect (this includes bipartite) graphs and claw-free graphs
[21].
With the exception of two examples in Section 4.1 illustrating the limits of our
theory, we will not look at games without Nash equilibria any more from now on.
3.2.3. Characterization and nonuniqueness
The concept of a KT-vector, which helped characterize worst-case optimal strat-
egies for the quizmaster in Theorem 3, now returns for a similar role in the character-
ization of worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.
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Theorem 7 (Characterization of Q∗). Under the conditions of Theorem 5 (HL finite and
continuous, all minimal supporting hyperplanes realizable), a strategy Q∗ ∈ Q is worst-
case optimal for the contestant if and only if the vector given by λx := maxy3x L(x,Q∗|y)
is a KT-vector.
If the loss L(x,Q∗|y) equals λx for all x ∈ y, then the worst-case optimal strategy Q∗ is
an equalizer strategy [19]: the expected loss of Q∗ does not depend on the quizmaster’s
strategy. Not all games have an equalizer strategy as worst-case optimal strategy, as
Example H below shows.
The following examples demonstrate that a worst-case optimal strategy for the con-
testant is in general not unique.
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 ∗ ∗ − −
y2 − ∗ ∗ −
y3 − − ∗ ∗
y4 ∗ − − ∗
px 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Example G (λ∗ not unique). Consider the game with
X, Y and p as in the table to the right, and with ran-
domized 0-1 loss. For the quizmaster, any P∗ that is
uniform given each y is worst-case optimal, and any
λa = (a, 1 − a, a, 1 − a) with a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector.
To each λa corresponds a unique worst-case optimal
Q∗, namely the strategy that puts conditional probabil-
ity 1−a on outcome x1 or x3 (whichever is in the given
message), and probability a on x2 or x4.
Note that if we replace randomized 0-1 loss by a strictly proper loss function such
as logarithmic or Brier loss, the KT-vector and the worst-case optimal strategy for the
contestant become unique, while the same set of strategies as before continues to be
worst-case optimal for the quizmaster. This shows that the freedom for the contestant
we see here for randomized 0-1 loss is due to the nonuniqueness of the KT-vector, not
due to the nonuniqueness of P∗.
P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/5 3/10 −
y2 − 3/10 1/5
y3 0 − 0
px 1/5 3/5 1/5
Example H (Minimal λ not unique). Consider the game
as shown in the table with logarithmic loss; the strategy P∗
shown in this table is the unique worst-case optimal strat-
egy for the quizmaster. Because logarithmic loss is proper,
we know that Q∗|y1 = P
∗(· | y1) and Q∗|y2 = P∗(· | y2) are
optimal responses for the contestant, but this does not tell
us what Q∗|y3 should be in a worst-case optimal strategy for
the contestant.
We see that P∗ assigns probability zero to message y3, and the KT-vector
λ∗ = (− log 2
5
,− log 3
5
,− log 2
5
)
specifies a hyperplane that does not support HL in ∆y3 . Hence the construction of Q
∗
|y3
in the proof of Theorem 5 allows freedom in the choice of a minimal element λ ∈ Λy3
less than (− log 2/5, 0,− log 2/5): the valid choices are (− log q, 0,− log(1− q)) for any
q ∈ [2/5, 3/5]; each of these is realized on y3 by Q|y3 = (q, 0, 1 − q). Using Theorem 7,
we can verify that these choices of Q∗|y3 define worst-case optimal strategies: the vector
λ defined there equals the KT-vector λ∗ given above.
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This also shows that worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant cannot be char-
acterized simply as ‘optimal responses to P∗’: in this example, P∗(· | y3) is undefined,
yet there is a nontrivial constraint on Q|y3 in the worst-case optimal strategy Q for the
contestant.
4. Results for well-behaved loss functions
In the preceding sections, we have established characterization results for the worst-
case optimal strategies of both players. While these results are applicable to many
loss functions, they have the disadvantage of being complicated, involving supporting
hyperplanes. For some common loss functions, simpler characterizations can be given.
4.1. Proper continuous loss functions
Recall from page 8 that for a proper loss function, the contestant’s expected loss
for a given message is minimized if his predicted probabilities equal the true probabil-
ities. Such loss functions are natural to consider in our probability updating game, as
our goal will often be to find these true probabilities. However, simplifying our theor-
ems requires further restrictions on the class of loss functions. In this subsection, we
consider loss functions that are both proper and continuous.
Lemma 8. If the loss function L(x,Q) is proper and continuous as a function of Q for
all x and HL is finite, then HL is differentiable in the following sense: for all y ∈ Y and
all P ∈ ∆y, there is at most one element of Λy that is a minimal supporting hyperplane
to HL  ∆y at P; if P is in the relative interior of ∆y, there is exactly one. If it exists, the
minimal supporting hyperplane at P is realized by Q|y = P.
The uniqueness of minimal supporting hyperplanes in Λy is equivalent to there be-
ing exactly one equivalence class of supergradients, where supergradients are taken to
be equivalent if their corresponding supporting hyperplanes coincide on ∆y. The prop-
erty shown in the above lemma is then related to differentiability by Rockafellar [17,
Theorem 25.1], which says that for a finite, concave function such as HL, uniqueness
of the supergradient at P is equivalent to differentiability at P.
Theorem 9. For L proper and continuous and HL finite and continuous,
1. worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist and form a Nash equilibrium;
2. there is a unique KT-vector;
3. a strategy P∗ ∈ P for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal if and only if there
exists λ∗ ∈ RX such that
L(x, P∗(· | y)) = λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(x, y) > 0,
L(x, P∗(· | y)) ≤ λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(x, y) = 0, P∗(y) > 0, and
∃Q∗|y : L(x,Q∗|y) ≤ λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(y) = 0;
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4. a strategy Q∗ for the contestant is worst-case optimal if and only if there exists a
worst-case optimal P∗ such that for all x,
max
y3x L(x,Q
∗
|y) = maxy3x,
P∗(y)>0
L(x, P∗(· | y)), (9)
which holds if and only if (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P∗.
Using this theorem, many observations made about logarithmic loss and Brier loss
in the examples we have seen so far can now be more easily verified. For instance,
in the worst-case optimal strategy we saw in Example E on page 18, we verify that
L(x2, P∗(· | y2)) = 1.5 ≤ 1.62 = λ∗x2 = L(x2, P∗(· | y1)).
Theorem 9 requires that L is both proper and continuous. If either condition is
removed then the conclusions of the theorem may fail to hold. Counterexamples for
either case where no Nash equilibrium exists are given by Van Ommen [1, Examples 6.J
and 6.K].
While uniqueness of λ∗ was established by the theorem, we do not have uniqueness
of P∗ or Q∗. Multiple worst-case optimal strategies Q∗ for the contestant may exist as
soon as a message is unused, as in Example H. Multiple worst-case optimal strategies
P∗ for the quizmaster are also possible, even for strictly proper L: see Example G. The
worst-case optimality criterion does not provide any guidance for selecting particular
strategies in such cases. One might make use of symmetry and/or various kinds of lim-
its to select a specific recommendation, or search for an analogue of subgame perfect
equilibria. We will leave such interesting extensions to future research.
4.2. Local loss functions
Logarithmic loss is an example of a local loss function: a loss function where the
loss L(x,Q) depends on the probability assigned by the prediction Q to the obtained
outcome x, but not on the probabilities assigned to outcomes that did not occur. The
following theorem shows how for such loss functions, worst-case optimality of the
quizmaster’s strategy can be characterized purely in terms of probabilities, without
converting them to losses.
Theorem 10 (Characterization of P∗ for local L). For L local and proper and HL finite
and continuous, P∗ ∈ P is worst-case optimal if there exists a vector q ∈ [0, 1]X such
that
qx = P∗(x | y) for all y ∈ Y, x ∈ y with P∗(y > 0), and∑
x∈y
qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y. (10)
If additionally HL  ∆y is strictly concave for all y ∈ Y, only such P∗ are worst-case
optimal for L.
Among loss functions that are ‘smooth’ for all x, logarithmic loss is, up to some
transformations, the only proper local loss function [22]. We do not know what non-
smooth local proper loss functions may exist. In particular, it is conceivable (yet un-
likely) that a discontinuous L exists satisfying the conditions of Theorem 10, but not
those of Theorem 9.
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If L is also continuous, then Theorem 9 applies, and it follows that Q∗ ∈ Q is a
worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant if Q∗|y(x) ≥ qx for all y ∈ Y, x ∈ y.
For strictly proper loss functions such as logarithmic loss, this fully characterizes the
worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.
P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/5 3/10 −
y2 − 3/10 1/5
y3 0 − 0
px 1/5 3/5 1/5
Example H (continued). Consider again the game shown
to the right with logarithmic loss. The conditionals P∗(x | y)
agree with the vector q = (2/5, 3/5, 2/5). For all y ∈ Y with
P∗(y) > 0, this implies that
∑
x∈y qx = 1; for y3, we see that
this sum equals 4/5 ≤ 1. Thus P∗ is verified to be worst-
case optimal.
The equality of conditionals P∗(x | y) with the same
x in the statement of Theorem 10 is oddly similar to the CAR condition we saw in
Section 1, but reversing the roles of outcomes and messages. We may say that a strategy
P∗ satisfying (10) is RCAR (sometimes with vector q), for ‘reverse CAR’. Note that
whether a strategy is RCAR does not depend on the loss function.
A vector q is called an RCAR vector if a strategy P∗ ∈ P exists such that P∗ and q
satisfy (10). This definition is also independent of the loss function. If q is an RCAR
vector, then qx > 0 for all x ∈ X; otherwise we would get P∗(x) = 0 < px. Like the
KT-vector λ∗ in Theorem 9, the RCAR vector is unique:
Lemma 11. Given X,Y, p, there exists a unique RCAR vector q ∈ [0, 1]X.
If each message in Y contains an outcome x not contained in any other message,
then any strategy P∗ must have P∗(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y. Then the first line of (10)
implies that
∑
x∈y qx = 1 for all y. Thus the second line is now satisfied automatically,
allowing the theorem to be simplified for this case:
Corollary 12. A strategy P∗ ∈ P with P∗(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y that satisfies
P∗(x | y) = P∗(x | y′) for all y, y′ 3 x (11)
is worst-case optimal for the loss functions covered by Theorem 10
In this case, P∗ is an equalizer strategy [19].
The symmetry between versions of CAR and RCAR is clearest in Corollary 12:
the condition (11) is the mirror image of the definition of strong CAR in Jaeger [8].
Thus we may call it strong RCAR. Ordinary RCAR (10) imposes an inequality on q
for messages with probability 0, which has no analogue in the CAR literature that we
know of: the definition of weak CAR in [8] puts no requirement at all on outcomes with
probability 0.
Strict concavity of HL occurred as a new condition in Theorem 10. The main loss
function of interest here is logarithmic loss, and its entropy is strictly concave. For
other loss functions, the following lemma relates strict concavity of HL to conditions
we have seen before.
Lemma 13. If L is strictly proper and all minimal supporting hyperplanes λ ∈ Λy to
HL  ∆y are realizable on y for all y ∈ Y, then HL is strictly concave on HL  ∆y for all
y ∈ Y.
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Affine transformations of the loss function. Previously, we mentioned that logarithmic
loss is the only local proper loss function up to some transformations. The transforma-
tions considered in Bernardo [22] are affine transformations, of the form
L′(x,Q) = aL(x,Q) + bx (12)
for a ∈ R>0 and b ∈ RX. (This transformation can result in a function L′ that can take
negative values, so that it does not satisfy our definition of a loss function. However,
our results can easily be extended to loss functions bounded from below by an arbitrary
real number, so we allow such transformations here.)
The following lemma shows that, for logarithmic loss as well as for other loss
functions, the transformation (12) does not change how the players of the probability
updating game should act.
Lemma 14. Let L be a loss function for which HL is finite and continuous, and let L′
be an affine transformation of L as in (12). Then a strategy P∗ is worst-case optimal for
the quizmaster in the game G′ := (X,Y, p, L′) if and only if P∗ is worst-case optimal
in G := (X,Y, p, L). If G also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5, then the same
equivalence holds for worst-case optimal strategies Q∗ for the contestant.
Lemma 14 has highly important implications when applied to the logarithmic loss.
While multiplying logarithmic loss by a constant a , 1 merely corresponds to changing
the base of the logarithm, adding constants bx allows the logarithmic loss to become
the appropriate loss function for a very wide class of games. This means that the RCAR
characterization of worst-case optimal strategies for logarithmic loss is also valid for
all these games. We are referring to so-called Kelly gambling games, also known as
horse race games [23] in the literature. In such games (with terminology adapted to our
setting), for any outcome x the contestant can buy a ticket which costs e 1 and which
pays off a positive amount e cx if x actually obtains; if some x′ , x is realized, nothing
is paid so the e 1 is lost. The contestant is allowed to distribute his capital over several
tickets (outcomes), and he is also allowed to buy a fractional nonnegative number of
tickets. For example, if X = {1, 2} and c1 = c2 = 2, then the contestant is guaranteed to
neither win nor lose any money if he splits his capital fifty-fifty over both outcomes.
Now consider a contestant with some initial capital (say, e 1), who faces an i.i.d.
sequence (X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), . . . ∼ P of outcomes in X × Y. At each point in time i he
observes ‘side information’ Yi = yi and he distributes his capital gained so far over all
x ∈ X, putting some fraction Q|yi (x) of his capital on outcome x. Then he is paid out
according to the xi that was actually realized. Here each Q|y is a probability distribution
over X, i.e. for all y ∈ Y, all x ∈ X, Q|y(x) ≥ 0 and ∑x∈X Q|y(x) = 1. So if his capital
was Ui before the i-th round, it will be Ui ·Q|yi (xi)cxi after the i-th round. By the law of
large numbers, his capital will grow (or shrink, depending on the odds on offer) almost
surely exponentially fast, with exponent EX,Y∼P[log Q|Y (X)cX] = EX,Y∼P[log Q|Y (X) −
bX], where bx = − log cx [23, Chapter 6]. Thus, the contestant’s capital will grow
fastest, among all constant strategies and against an adversarial distribution P ∈ P, if
he plays a worst-case optimal strategy for gains log Q(x) − bx, i.e. for loss function
L′(x,Q) = − log Q(x) + bx. By Lemma 14 above, this worst-case optimal strategy Q∗
is just the Q∗ that is also worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss — it does not depend
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on the pay-offs (‘odds’ in the horse race interpretation) cx. Clearly, if data are i.i.d.
then this continues to hold even if the pay-offs are allowed to change over time, and
even if the contestant is allowed to use different strategies at different time points: the
worst-case optimal capital growth rate is always achieved by choosing Q∗ at all time
points.
The upshot is that whenever (a) the probability updating game is played repeatedly,
and (b) the contestant is allowed to reinvest and redistribute his capital over all out-
comes at each point in time, then his worst-case optimal strategy is equal to the worst-
case optimal Q∗ for logarithmic loss irrespective of the pay-offs. This makes the loga-
rithmic loss, and hence the RCAR characterization, appropriate for a very wide class
of settings.
5. The RCAR characterization for general loss functions
Our results so far have focused on properties of the loss function L. This section
will focus on understanding a game’s message structureY. For the purpose of summar-
izing our main theorems in simplified form, we restrict attention to irreducible games.
Those are games which are connected (a game is disconnected if the outcome space can
be partitioned such that each message is contained within one of the parts) and contain
no dominated messages (a message is dominated if it is a strict subset of another mes-
sage). We say that a game is a graph game (Section 5.3) if all its messages are binary,
and we call it a matroid game (Section 5.4) if its messages satisfy the basis exchange
property [24, Corollary 1.2.5] detailed below. The abstract matroid property holds for
a rich class of games, including e.g. negation games, where each message excludes a
single outcome. Monty Hall (Example B) is both a graph and a matroid game. We also
need a mild condition on loss functions. We call a loss function regular if it is invariant
under permutations of the outcomes, and has finite and continuous associated entropy
function HL.
To solve a quizmaster-contestant game, we are typically looking for a Nash equilib-
rium (saddle point strategy pair). In general, not only the contestant’s optimal response
but also the optimal quizmaster strategy will depend on the loss function. This de-
pendence renders probability updating an application-dependent endeavour. Our main
result in this section is that for an important class of games (and only these) the op-
timal quizmaster strategy is independent of the loss function. For these cases we derive
a probability update rule that is application independent, like standard probability con-
ditioning, but that applies much more broadly. The following is the summary result of
this section (the precise statements can be found in Theorems 18, 19 and 20).
Theorem 15. Fix an irreducible game with set of messages Y. Then
Y is a graph
or a matroid
iff
for any marginal on outcomes, the worst-case
optimal strategy for the quizmaster is identical
for all regular loss functions
We first show a simple method of simplifying message structures in Section 5.1; there
we will also see that if Y is a partition of X, naive conditioning is worst-case optimal.
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In Section 5.2, we consider symmetry properties that worst-case optimal strategies
must have, provided that the loss function also obeys a form of symmetry. Then in
Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we show two classes of message structures for which the worst-
case optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be characterized by the RCAR condition
(10). This is the condition that also characterizes worst-case optimal strategies for
local loss functions and for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs (by Theorem 10 and
Lemma 14); the results in this section show that the same characterization sometimes
holds for a much more general class of loss functions. This leads to an interesting
property of those (and only those) message structures, discussed in Section 5.5: the
same strategy P∗ will be optimal for the quizmaster regardless of the loss function.
We will look at the game from the perspective of the quizmaster, and consider
worst-case optimal strategies P∗ for him. In games for which a Nash equilibrium exists,
the contestant’s worst-case optimal strategies can be found easily once we know P∗ and
a KT-vector certifying its optimality as in Theorem 3: given a KT-vector, Q∗ can be
constructed message-by-message to satisfy the condition in Theorem 7. This is even
easier in the case of proper loss functions, where for each y with P∗(y) > 0, an optimal
response is simply Q∗|y = P
∗(· | y). Another advantage of looking at the game from the
quizmaster’s side is that our Theorem 3 characterizing worst-case optimal P∗ requires
weaker conditions than Theorem 7 characterizing worst-case optimal Q∗.
5.1. Decomposition of games
For some message structures, regardless of the marginal and loss function, the prob-
lem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be solved by con-
sidering a smaller message structure instead. It will be useful to look at such simpli-
fications first, so that in the coming sections we will only need to deal with message
structures that have already been simplified.
We have already seen one example of the type of result we are looking for ear-
lier, in Lemma 2 on page 13, where we saw that if a message is dominated by another
(meaning that it is a subset of the other), then the quizmaster always has a worst-case
optimal strategy that assigns probability 0 to the dominated message. In this subsec-
tion, we introduce a second simplification, by means of decomposition into connected
components.
Connectivity is a fundamental concept from graph theory. However, in general,
our message structures are not graphs, but hypergraphs. Like an ordinary graph, a
hypergraph is defined by a set of nodes and a set of edges, but the edges are allowed to
be arbitrary subsets of the nodes; in a graph, all edges must contain exactly two nodes.
Thus for a probability updating game, we can talk about the hypergraph (X,Y), having
the outcomes as its nodes and the messages as its edges.
The terminology of connectivity can be generalized from graphs to hypergraphs
[15]. We will say that a game is connected if its underlying hypergraph is connected.
This leads to the following definitions.
If for some game G = (X,Y, p, L), there is a set ∅ ( S ( X such that for each
message y, either y ⊆ S or y ⊆ X \ S , then the game can be decomposed into two
games G1 = (X1,Y1, p(1), L) and G2 = (X2,Y2, p(2), L) with X1 = S , X2 = X \ S ,
Yi = {y ∈ Y | y ⊆ Xi}, and p(i)(x) = p(x)/∑x′∈Xi p(x′). If no such set S exists, we say
the game G is connected.
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Lemma 16 (Decomposition). If a game G can be decomposed into G1 and G2 as
described above, and its loss function L is such that HL is finite and continuous and
HL(P) = infQ∈∆y
∑
x∈y P(x)L(x,Q) for each y ∈ Y and each P ∈ ∆y, then a strategy
P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in G if and only if there exist worst-case
optimal strategies for the quizmaster P∗1 and P
∗
2 in G1 and G2 respectively such that
P∗(x, y) =
P∗1(x, y) ·
∑
x′∈X1 p(x
′) for x ∈ X1;
P∗2(x, y) ·
∑
x′∈X2 p(x
′) for x ∈ X2.
(The extra condition on L is necessary to exclude some ‘very improper’ loss func-
tions: those that reward the contestant for predicting outcomes known to have prob-
ability 0.) In particular, if the messages of G form a partition of X, then G can be
decomposed into games that each contain only one message. In a game G of this form,
the quizmaster has only one strategy to choose from. If the loss function is proper,
naive conditioning is an optimal response to this strategy, and thus worst-case optimal.
Together with Lemma 2, this lemma allows us to reduce any game in which we
want to find a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster to a set of connected
games containing no dominated messages. These reduced games will not contain any
messages of size one, unless one of the games consists of only that message: a message
of size one is either dominated, or it forms a trivial component containing no other
messages.
5.2. Outcome symmetry
Sometimes, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy is simplified be-
cause certain ‘symmetry’ properties of the message structure and loss function allow us
to conclude that worst-case optimal strategies satisfying an additional condition must
have the same symmetries.
5.2.1. Symmetry of loss functions
We now briefly return to the topic of loss functions to define a property we will
need next. For a probability distribution Q ∈ ∆X and x1, x2 distinct elements of X,
define Qx1↔x2 as
Qx1↔x2 (x) =

Q(x2) for x = x1;
Q(x1) for x = x2;
Q(x) otherwise,
and similarly for a contestant’s strategy Q ∈ Q by applying this transformation to the
conditional for each y. We say L is symmetric between x1 and x2 if for all Q ∈ ∆X,
we have L(x1,Q) = L(x2,Qx1↔x2 ) and L(x,Q) = L(x,Qx1↔x2 ) for all x ∈ X \ {x1, x2}.
If L is symmetric between x1 and x2 and between x2 and x3, then it is also symmetric
between x1 and x3, because ((Qx1↔x2 )x2↔x3 )x1↔x2 = Qx1↔x3 . In words: we can apply the
first symmetry, then the second, then the first again to find that we have exchanged x1
and x3. We also consider any loss function to be symmetric between x and x for any x.
So this symmetry of L is an equivalence relation on X, and we are justified in talking
about L being symmetric on sets S ⊆ X, meaning that all pairs of elements of that set
can be exchanged. If L is symmetric on X, we say it is fully symmetric.
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The loss functions we have seen so far were fully symmetric. The affine transform-
ations of loss functions discussed at the end of Section 4.2 may change the symmetries
of a loss function, while they do not change which strategies are worst-case optimal for
the two players. This means that sometimes, an asymmetric loss function can be trans-
formed into an essentially equivalent loss function with better symmetry properties.
Yet not all loss functions can be transformed this way. The following two examples are
about loss functions exhibiting this kind of inherent asymmetry.
Example I (Matrix loss). Given a [0,∞)-valued X×X matrix of losses A, define hard
matrix loss by
L(x,Q) =
Ax,x′ if Q(x′) = 1 for some x′;∞ otherwise.
This generalizes hard 0-1 loss, which is obtained for the matrix A with zeroes on the
diagonal and ones elsewhere (except that the definition above may give infinite loss for
some Q, but a rational contestant would never use such Q). It is symmetric between
x1 and x2 if and only if swapping row x1 with x2 and column x1 with x2 results in
matrix A again; that is, if and only if Ax1,x1 = Ax2,x2 , Ax1,x2 = Ax2,x1 , Ax′,x1 = Ax′,x2 , and
Ax1,x′ = Ax2,x′ , for all x
′ ∈ X \ {x1, x2}.
We can also define randomized matrix loss as an analogous generalization of ran-
domized 0-1 loss, by taking an expectation over Q in hard matrix loss:
L(x,Q) =
∑
x′∈X
Q(x′)Ax,x′ .
It has the same symmetry properties as hard matrix loss. The proof of Proposition 6
also applies to randomized matrix loss without modification, showing that a Nash equi-
librium exists in games using this loss function.
Example J (Skewed logarithmic loss). Fix a vector c ∈ RX≥0, and define the function
F : ∆X → R≥0 by
F(P) := −
∑
x∈X
cxP(x) log P(x).
This is a sum of differentiable concave functions, and therefore differentiable and con-
cave; if c ∈ RX>0, it is strictly concave (in fact, it is also strictly concave if c contains
a single 0). We use the construction of Bregman scores in Gru¨nwald and Dawid [14,
Section 3.5.4] to construct a proper loss function L having F as its generalized entropy,
and find
L(x,Q) = F(Q) + (ex − Q) · ∇F(Q) = −cx(1 + log Q(x)) +
∑
x′∈X
cx′Q(x′),
where ex is the distribution that puts all mass on x. This loss function is strictly proper
if HL is strictly concave. Unlike logarithmic loss and its affine transformations, it is not
local for |X| > 2. Also, it is not generally fully symmetric, but is symmetric between
pairs of outcomes x1, x2 ∈ X with cx1 = cx2 .
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5.2.2. Symmetry of KT-vectors
Using the definition of symmetry of loss functions introduced in the previous sec-
tion, we can now state the following lemma.
Lemma 17 (Loss exchange). Consider a game with y1, y2 ∈ Y, y1 \ y2 = {x1}, y2 \ y1 =
{x2}, HL finite and continuous and L symmetric between x1 and x2. If a worst-case
optimal strategy P∗ for the quizmaster exists with P∗(x1, y1) > 0, then all KT-vectors λ∗
satisfy λ∗x1 ≤ λ∗x2 (so if in addition P∗(x2, y2) > 0 then λ∗x1 = λ∗x2 ).
When two messages y1, y2 ∈ Y satisfy y1 \ y2 = {x1} and y2 \ y1 = {x2}, we say that
they differ by the exchange of one outcome.
It will be useful to have a term for the symmetry conditions on L that allow us to
apply Lemma 17 to any pair of messages in some set Y′ ⊆ Y satisfying the statement
of the lemma. We say L is symmetric with respect to exchanges inY′ if L is symmetric
between any pair of outcomes x1, x2 such that messages y1, y2 ∈ Y′ exist with y1 \ y2 =
{x1} and y2 \ y1 = {x2}.
We saw in Theorem 10 that for logarithmic loss, worst-case optimal strategies for the
quizmaster can be characterized in terms of a simple condition, the RCAR condition
(10). We also saw that sometimes (in Examples B and C on pages 15 and 17, but
not in Example D), those same strategies were also worst-case optimal for other loss
functions. This suggests that even for some types of games where Theorem 10 does not
apply, it is possible to recognize worst-case optimal strategies using the easily verifiable
RCAR condition. We show that there are two classes of message structures in which
this is possible regardless of the marginal, and explore the consequences in Section 5.5.
5.3. Graph games
The first of these classes consist of all message structuresY for which each message
contains at most two outcomes. After removing singleton messages (which are either
dominated or are decomposable from the rest of the game), we have |y| = 2 for all
y ∈ Y. This corresponds to a simple undirected graph (that is, a graph containing
no loops or multiple edges) with a node for each outcome in X and an edge for each
message in Y. For this reason, a game where each message in Y contains at most two
outcomes is called a graph game. Many games we saw in previous examples were
graph games. Their underlying graphs are shown in Figure 4.
Theorem 18 (RCAR for graph games). If each message in Y contains at most two
outcomes and P∗ ∈ P is an RCAR strategy, then P∗ is worst-case optimal for all L
symmetric with respect to exchanges in {y ∈ Y | |y| = 2} with HL finite and continuous.
If additionally HL is strictly concave, only such P∗ are worst-case optimal for L.
The statement of the theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 10 in Section 4.2,
and the restrictions on L in the present theorem (except for symmetry) were also seen
in the previous theorem. Sufficient conditions for these restrictions to hold were given
by Lemma 1 in Section 3.1 (HL finite and continuous) and Lemma 13 in Section 4.2
(strict concavity of HL).
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Figure 4: Underlying graphs of the graph games seen in the examples
The intuition behind the proof is that for binary predictions Q, the probability as-
signed by Q to one outcome determines the probability Q assigns to the other outcome.
Thus all loss functions are essentially local when used to assess such predictions, and
their behaviour is similar to logarithmic loss.
5.4. Matroid games
The other class is that of matroid games. A matroid over a finite ground set X can
be defined by a nonempty familyY of subsets ofX (the bases of the matroid) satisfying
the basis exchange property [24, Corollary 1.2.5]: for all y1, y2 ∈ Y and x1 ∈ y1 \ y2,
(y1 \ {x1}) ∪ {x2} ∈ Y for some x2 ∈ y2 \ y1. (13)
In words, for any pair of messages, if an outcome that is not in the second message is
removed from the first message, it must be possible to replace it by an outcome from
the second message that is not in the first message, in such a way that the resulting set
of outcomes is again a message.
A matroid game is a game in which Y is the set of bases of a matroid. The Monty
Hall game (Example B) is a matroid game: taking one of the two messages and repla-
cing the outcome unique to it by the only other outcome will result in the other message.
By our definition of a game, it is required in addition to (13) that each element of the
ground set X of the matroid occurs in some basis.
Many alternative characterizations of matroids exist. For example, a matroid with
ground set X and bases Y can also be represented by its family of independent sets
I = {I ⊆ X | I ⊆ y for some y ∈ Y}, and a different set of axioms analogous to (13)
characterizes whether a given set I is the family of independent sets of some matroid.
The concept of a matroid was introduced by Whitney [25] to study the abstract
properties of the notion of dependence, as seen for example in linear algebra and graph
theory (explained below). Different characterizations of the concept, applied to dif-
ferent examples, were given independently by other authors, but then turned out to be
31
equivalent to matroids. One field where matroids play an important role is combinat-
orial optimization. We refer to Schrijver [21, Section 39.10b] for extensive historical
notes.
We give two example classes of matroids, taken from Schrijver [21, Section 39.4]:
• Given an m × n matrix A over some vector space, let X = {1, 2, . . . , n} and I the
family of all subsets I of X such that the set of column vectors with index in I is
linearly independent. Then I is the family of independent sets of a matroid. A
subset that spans the column space of A is a basis of this matroid.
• Given a simple undirected graph G, let X be its set of edges and I consist of all
acyclic subsets of X. Then I is the family of independent sets of a matroid. This
matroid is called the cycle matroid of G. The bases are the maximal independent
sets; if G is connected, these are its spanning trees.
One interesting class of games for which Y are the bases of a matroid is the class
of negation games. In such a game, each element ofY is of the formX\{x} for some x.
(Not all sets of this form need to be in Y.) Thus the quizmaster will tell the contestant,
“The true outcome is not x,” as in the original Monty Hall problem where one of the
three doors is opened to reveal a goat. A family Y of this form satisfies (13) trivially:
for y1, y2 distinct elements of Y, there is only one choice for each of x1 and x2, and
with these choices we get (y1 \ {x1}) ∪ {x2} = y2 ∈ Y.
Another class of matroids is formed by the uniform matroids, in which every set of
some fixed size k is a basis. These also have a natural interpretation when they occur as
the message structure of a game: the quizmaster is allowed to leave any set of k doors
shut.
As the following theorem shows, matroid games share with graph games the prop-
erty that RCAR strategies are worst-case optimal for a wide variety of loss functions.
Theorem 19 (RCAR for matroid games). If Y are the bases of a matroid and P∗ ∈ P
is an RCAR strategy, then P∗ is worst-case optimal for all L symmetric with respect to
exchanges in Y with HL finite and continuous. If additionally HL is strictly concave,
only such P∗ are worst-case optimal for L.
5.5. Loss invariance
We saw in the preceding sections that in graph and matroid games, worst-case op-
timal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by the RCAR property. This prop-
erty does not depend on what loss function is used in the game (though the theorems
do put some conditions on the loss function, such as some symmetry requirements).
Consequently, in such games, strategies exist that are worst-case optimal regardless of
what loss function is used (at least, for a large class of loss functions). We call this
phenomenon loss invariance.
For such message structures, we can really think of the worst-case optimal strat-
egies as ‘conditioning’ (as a purely probability-based operation) rather than as worst-
case optimal strategies for some game. This conditioning operation can be seen as the
generalization of naive conditioning to message structures other than partitions (where
naive conditioning gives the right answer). Unlike naive conditioning, which requires
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just the distribution p and the message y to compute P(x | y), we also need the message
structureY to compute that conditional probability. But like naive conditioning, we do
not need to fix a loss function in order to talk about the worst-case optimal prediction
of x given a message y.
A subtlety appears when improper loss functions are considered. Our theorems
show that the worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized inde-
pendently of the loss function; however, the worst-case optimal strategies for the con-
testant will not necessarily coincide with these if the loss function is not proper. In this
case, loss invariance tells us that the loss function does not affect what the contestant
should believe about the true outcome, but it may affect how the contestant translates
this belief into a prediction.
In the cases of graph and matroid games, our analysis of worst-case optimal strat-
egies becomes more widely applicable in situations where the probability updating
game is really played by two players (as opposed to being a theoretical tool for defin-
ing safe updating strategies):
• the same strategies continue to be worst-case optimal if the two players use dif-
ferent loss functions (so that the game is no longer zero-sum);
• both players will be able to play optimally without knowing the loss function(s)
in use.
This is true for the Monty Hall game (Example B), which lies in the intersection of
graph and matroid games. This provides some justification for the prevailing intuition
that the Monty Hall problem should be analysed using probability theory, without men-
tion of loss functions.
Theorems 18 and 19 apply only to loss functions that are sufficiently symmetric and
for which HL is continuous and finite. We make no claim about the question whether
RCAR strategies are also worst-case optimal for loss functions that do not satisfy these
properties. However, note that by Lemma 14, sometimes affine transformations can be
used to convert an asymmetric loss function into a symmetric one without affecting the
players’ strategies.
Lemma 14 also shows that a limited form of loss invariance holds regardless of the
message structure. If the players are using different affine transformations of the same
loss function (for example, of logarithmic loss; this corresponds to Kelly gambling
where the pay-offs for the contestant are different from those for the quizmaster), both
players can play optimally without knowing the transformations in use.
An obvious question that remains is: are there any other classes of message struc-
ture for which we have loss invariance? This is answered in the negative by the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 20. If a connected game containing no dominated messages is neither a
matroid game nor a graph game, then there exists a marginal such that no strategy P
for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal for both logarithmic loss and Brier loss.
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6. Conclusion
Conditioning is the method of choice for updating probabilities to incorporate new
information. We started by reviewing why naive conditioning gives incorrect answers
when the set of messages is not a partition of the set of outcomes. For in this case
the association of messages to outcomes (the coarsening mechanism, or quizmaster
strategy) needs to be taken into account. In general however, this mechanism is un-
known. Previous work showed that conditioning is correct if the mechanism satisfies
(variants of) the CAR (coarsening at random) condition. In this article we take a dif-
ferent route and investigate minimax probability updating strategies that are robust to
the worst-case coarsening mechanism. To this end we modelled probability updating
as a two-player zero sum game between a quizmaster and a contestant. In Section 3
we discussed the optimal strategies for both players, characterizing both the hardest
coarsening mechanism (quizmaster strategy) and the worst-case optimal way to incor-
porate new information (contestant strategy). In Section 4 we specialized the results to
different classes of loss functions. A summary of these theorems was given in Table 1
on page 13. Then in Section 5 we investigated graph and matroid games, and show
that for these games the worst-case optimal strategy does not depend on which loss
function is used by both players, so that the updated probabilities are independent of
the intended application.
6.1. Future work
There are many scenarios in which our results currently do not apply, but to which
they might be extended. For example, the quizmaster’s hard constraint y 3 x could
be replaced by some soft constraint, so that each message y still carries information
about the true outcome, but no longer in the form of a subset of X. One way to achieve
this might be by affine transformations of the loss function as discussed at the end of
Section 4.2, but allowing the constants to depend on both x and y. This could give a
worst-case analogue to Jeffrey conditioning or minimum relative entropy updating [4].
Possible extensions would be to infinite outcome and message spaces. We are also
interested in probability updating in sequential (online) interaction protocols [26].
Other questions concern the comparison between different alternative approaches
the contestant might use to update his probabilities. For example, can we bound the
difference in expected loss between worst-case optimal and naive conditioning? What
about ignoring the message and always predicting with the marginal, or ignoring the
constraints imposed on the quizmaster by the marginal and predicting with the max-
imum entropy distribution on y? (Both these strategies are overly pessimistic.) Con-
versely, we might wonder how much the contestant loses by playing a worst-case op-
timal strategy when the quizmaster is not adversarial, but for instance chooses from the
available messages uniformly at random. In this context it is also of interest how to
resolve the problem of non-unique worst-case optimal strategies in a principled way.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For finite HL, concavity of HL is shown by Gru¨nwald and Dawid
[14, Proposition 3.2], and lower semi-continuity by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 10.2]
(using that the domain of HL is a simplex). If L is finite, then picking any Q ∈ ∆X gives
an upper bound to HL, so that HL is in particular finite. Concavity now follows by the
first claim, and continuity by Gru¨nwald and Dawid [14, Corollary 3.3; an important
condition is in Corollary 3.2].
Proof of Lemma 2. If P(y2) = 0 then P′ = P and the result is trivial; if P(y2) > 0 but
P(y1) = 0, then P(· | y2) = P′(· | y1) so P and P′ have the same expected generalized
entropy. Otherwise P(· | y1) and P(· | y2) are well-defined, and P′(· | y1) = (P(y1)P(· |
y1) + P(y2)P(· | y2))/(P(y1) + P(y2)) is a convex combination of them. By concavity of
HL,
∑
y P′(y)HL(P′(· | y)) ≥ ∑y P(y)HL(P(· | y)).
Proof of Theorem 3. Rockafellar [17, Theorem 27.3] gives conditions under which a
convex minimization problem has a solution attaining the minimum. These are satisfied
by P and −HL: P is nonempty, closed, convex, and bounded (thus has no direction of
recession), and −HL is convex (Lemma 1), finite for all P ∈ P (thus proper), and lower
semi-continuous (thus closed).
By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 28.2.2], a KT-vector λ∗ exists, so that for the re-
maining claims of the theorem, it suffices to show that P∗ is worst-case optimal and
λ∗ is a KT-vector if and only if the given conditions on (P∗, λ∗) hold. To prove this,
we rewrite the maximin problem to a convex optimization problem where P may range
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over P ∈ RR(X,Y)≥0 , a strict superset of P. In this larger set, P(x | y) := P(x, y)/P(y) still
defines a conditional probability distribution for y with P(y) > 0, because any scale
factor cancels out.
The following function extends the quizmaster’s objective function (5) (the expec-
ted generalized entropy of P ∈ P) to the domain RR(X,Y)≥0 :
f0(P) := inf
Q∈Q
∑
y∈Y,x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y)
=
∑
y∈Y:
P(y)>0
inf
Q|y∈∆X
∑
x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y) =
∑
y∈Y:
P(y)>0
P(y)HL(P(· | y)).
Using this concave function (infimum of linear functions), the convex optimization
problem is given by
maximize f0(P)
subject to
∑
y3x
P(x, y) = px for all x ∈ X,
with P ∈ RR(X,Y)≥0 . By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 28.3], P∗ ∈ RR(X,Y)≥0 maximizes this
and λ∗ ∈ RX is a KT-vector if and only if P∗ ∈ P and at P∗, the zero vector is a
supergradient to
f0(P∗) −
∑
x∈X
λ∗x
∑
y3x
P∗(x, y) − px
 . (A.1)
The term being subtracted is linear, with gradient λ¯ ∈ RR(X,Y) given by
λ¯x,y :=
∂
∂P∗(x, y)
∑
x∈X
λ∗x
∑
y3x
P∗(x, y) − px
 = λ∗x. (A.2)
By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.8], 0 is a supergradient to (A.1) if and only if λ¯ is a
supergradient to f0 at P∗.
For any P∗ that is not everywhere zero, we have for all c ≥ 0 that f0(cP∗) = c f0(P∗),
so that a supporting hyperplane to f0 at any P∗ ∈ P must go through the origin. Then
the supporting hyperplane with gradient λ¯ has as defining equation the linear expression∑
x,y P(x, y)λ¯x,y.
If
∑
x,y P(x, y)λ¯x,y defines a supporting hyperplane to f0 at P∗, then
1. at every y ∈ Y with P∗(y) > 0, it is a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at
P∗(· | y), and
2. for every y with P∗(y) = 0, HL(P′) ≤ ∑x P′(x)λ¯x,y for all P′ ∈ ∆y.
The converse also holds: we have for all y ∈ Y and P′ ∈ ∆y that HL(P′) ≤ ∑x∈y P′λ¯x,y,
with equality if P∗(y) > 0 and P′ = P∗(· | y); taking the convex combination with coef-
ficients P∗(y) shows that the hyperplane defined by
∑
x,y P(x, y)λ¯x,y is nowhere below
f0 and touches it at P = P∗.
For λ¯ of the required form (A.2), this is in turn equivalent to the characterization
given in the statement of the theorem.
37
Proof of Lemma 4. The function
∑
x∈y λxP(x)−HL(P) attains its minimum d on ∆y at
some P [17, Theorem 27.3]. Let λ′ ∈ Λy be given by λ′x = λx − d for all x ∈ y: this
defines a hyperplane to HL  ∆y that is supporting at the minimizing P, proving the first
part of the lemma.
For the third part, let λ, λ′ and P be as described. λ′ ≤ λ implies P>λ′ ≤ P>λ.
Neither can be smaller than HL(P), and since the right hand side must equal HL(P)
because λ is supporting at P, so must the left hand side, showing that λ′ is also sup-
porting at P. If P(x) = 1 for some x ∈ y, then P>λ′′ = λ′′x for any λ′′, so in particular
λ′x = λx = HL(P). For other P ∈ ∆y, we use that two linear functions obeying an
inequality on their domain D := ∆{x∈y|P(x)>0} and coinciding at a point in the relative
interior of D must coincide everywhere on D, so that again λ′x = λx for x ∈ y with
P(x) > 0.
It remains to show that given such a λ, a minimal λ′ ≤ λ exists in Λy. Consider the
set Λ′ := {λ′ ∈ Λy | λ′ ≤ λ}. The set of supporting hyperplanes to HL  ∆y at P in Λy
is closed [17, Section 23, definition subdifferential (page 215)]; Λ′ is a subset of this
set (as we just saw), obtained by adding further non-strict linear constraints, so it too is
closed. It also has the property that if λ′ ∈ Λ′ is minimal in that set, it is also minimal in
Λy. Now fix any P′ in the relative interior of ∆y, and pick some λ′ ∈ Λ′ that minimizes
P′>λ′ (this minimum must be attained because the expression is bounded below and Λ′
is closed). Such a λ′ is also minimal in the partial order, so it is the element we are
looking for.
Proof of Theorem 5. Take a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ for the quizmaster and
KT-vector λ∗. For each y ∈ Y, define a vector
λ′x =
λ∗x for x ∈ y0 for x < y.
By the statement of Theorem 3, λ′ ∈ Λy. Let λ be a minimal element of Λy with λ ≤ λ′:
such an element exists by parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 4. (If λ′ is itself minimal, λ = λ′).
By assumption, λ is realizable on y. Let Q∗|y be given by this Q.
By playing this Q∗, the contestant will achieve expected loss (against any strategy
P ∈ P for the quizmaster, for λ∗ any KT-vector)∑
x,y
P(x, y)L(x,Q∗|y) ≤
∑
x,y
P(x, y)λ∗x =
∑
x
pxλ∗x.
The right-hand side is the maximum loss the quizmaster can achieve in the maximin
game. By (7), the reverse inequality also holds, so we find that the values of the min-
imax and maximin games must be equal.
Proof of Proposition 6. We first introduce some additional terminology in order to
apply a corollary from Rockafellar [17].
A nonvertical hyperplane defined by λ ∈ RX is geometrically a subset of RX × R,
namely {(P′, z′) ∈ RX × R | z′ = P′>λ}. This set is the boundary of the half-space
Hλ = {(P′, z′) ∈ RX × R | z′ ≤ P′>λ}. A hyperplane λ is supporting to a concave
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function f : RX → R at the point P ∈ RX with f (P) = P>λ if and only if the hypograph
of f is a subset of Hλ.
A column vector (−αλ, α) is called normal to a convex set C at a point (P, z) ∈ C
if (P′ − P, z′ − z)>(−αλ, α) ≤ 0 for all (P′, z′) ∈ C [17]; that is, if C ⊆ {(P′, z′) |
(P′ − P, z′ − z)>(−αλ, α) ≤ 0}. This latter set is equal to Hλ if α > 0 and z = P>λ. So if
C is the hypograph of f and f (P) = z = P>λ, then λ is a supporting hyperplane to f at
P if and only if (−λ, 1) is normal to C.
The set of all vectors normal to C at (P, z) is called the normal cone at (P, z). The
normal cone to Hλ at given (P, P>λ) is the half-line {(−αλ, α) | α ∈ [0,∞)}.
For L randomized 0-1 loss, let the function f0 : RX → R be given by f0(P) =
minQ∈∆X
∑
x′∈X P(x′)L(x′,Q); note that f0  ∆X = HL, and that for all y ∈ Y, any
minimal supporting hyperplane λ ∈ Λy to HL  ∆y can be extended to a supporting
hyperplane λ′ to f0 with λ′x = λx for all x ∈ y.
The hypograph of f0 is C =
⋂
x∈X Hλ(x) , with λ
(x)
x′ = L(x
′, ex) (where ex is the
distribution that puts all mass on x). By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 23.8.1], for C of
this form and (P, z) a point on the boundary of C, the normal cone of C at (P, z) is the
sum of the individual normal cones. The normal cone of any set at a point in the interior
of that set is just {0}, so we can ignore those halfspaces when determining the normal
cone. Then the corollary says that any vector (−λ, 1) normal to f0 at (P, f0(P)) can be
written as
∑
x∈X:P>λ(x)= f0(P)(−αxλ(x), αx): λ is a convex combination of those λ(x).
Conclusion: any minimal supporting hyperplane λ to HL  ∆y at P ∈ ∆y with
randomized 0-1 loss is a convex combination of the hyperplanes realized by hard 0-1
loss that are supporting at P. Therefore, randomizing allows the contestant to realize
λ.
Proof of Theorem 7. From Theorem 5, we know that a strategy exists for the contest-
ant that achieves loss
∑
x pxλ∗x where λ∗ is any KT-vector, and that this is worst-case
optimal. Hence Q∗ is worst-case optimal if and only if it achieves the same worst-case
expected loss. The worst-case expected loss of a strategy Q ∈ Q is
max
P∈P
∑
x,y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y) =
∑
x
px max
y3x L(x,Q|y).
Therefore if for all x, y with x ∈ y, we have L(x,Q|y) ≤ λ∗x for some KT-vector λ∗, Q is
worst-case optimal.
For the converse, pick any Q ∈ Q and suppose that the vector given by λx :=
maxy L(x,Q|y) is not a KT-vector. Then by Theorem 3, there is no P ∈ P such that P
and λ satisfy the conditions of that theorem. Equivalently, for all P ∈ P, there either
is a message y such that the hyperplane defined by λ passes below HL somewhere in
∆y, or there is a message y with P(y) > 0 but the hyperplane lies strictly above HL at
P(· | y). The former contradicts the definition of HL, so for λ not a KT-vector, the latter
must be the case. But then against any P ∈ P (in particular against worst-case optimal
P), there is a different strategy Q′ ∈ Q that is equal to Q except for its response to the
message y: Q′|y realizes a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P(· | y). This strategy Q′
obtains strictly smaller expected loss than Q, so Q is not worst-case optimal. (In other
words: in a Nash equilibrium (P∗,Q∗), the contestant can only do worse against P∗ by
changing strategy, but here he can do better.)
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Proof of Lemma 8. For proper loss functions, L and HL are related as follows: at all
y ∈ Y and P ∈ ∆y, if the vector λ = L(·, P) is finite at all x ∈ y, it describes the
nonvertical hyperplane realized by P, which is a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at
P.
Now suppose that at some P ∈ ∆y, there exists a minimal supporting hyperplane
λ′ ∈ Λy other than λ := L(· | P), the supporting hyperplane realized by P (here we al-
low vertical hyperplanes, for which λ may include infinities). Let x ∈ y be an outcome
where λ′x < λx, which exists by minimality of λ′. Write ex for the probability distribu-
tion that puts all mass on this outcome, and define Pα := (1 − α)P + αex for α ∈ (0, 1].
For each of these points Pα, the hyperplane L(·, Pα) realized by Pα is at most as high as
λ′ at Pα (because L(·, Pα) is supporting there) and at least as high as λ′ at P (where λ′ is
supporting), so L(x, Pα) is bounded away from λx by λ′x: L(x, Pα) ≤ λ′x < λx. Therefore
limα↓0 L(x, Pα) , L(x, P), and L is not continuous. For L proper and continuous, this
proves the ‘at most one’ part of the lemma.
For the ‘exactly one’ part: by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.3], a nonvertical sup-
porting hyperplane may only fail to exist at P if there is a line segment through P
falling inside ∆y on one side of P and outside on the other; that is, for P on the relative
boundary of ∆y.
Finally, suppose that λ = L(·, P) (the hyperplane realized by P) is finite at all x ∈ y
but not minimal. Then by Lemma 4, a different minimal supporting hyperplane λ′
exists at P, which by the above gives a contradiction. This shows that if λ is finite, it is
the minimal supporting hyperplane.
Proof of Theorem 9. Theorem 3 applies, showing existence of a KT-vector and a
worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster.
A worst-case optimal Q∗ exists and forms a Nash equilibrium with P∗: For each y ∈
Y and each P ∈ ∆y, by Lemma 8 there is at most one minimal supporting hyperplane
at P which is then realized by Q = P. So all minimal supporting hyperplanes are
realizable on y, and Theorem 5 applies.
Next we show that the characterization of P∗ and λ∗ in Theorem 3 is equivalent
to the one in this theorem. We consider y with P∗(y) > 0 first. If P∗ is a worst-case
optimal strategy for the quizmaster λ∗ defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at
P∗(· | y), then by Lemma 4 there exists a minimal λ′ ∈ Λy which is also supporting
at P∗(· | y) and which satisfies λ′x ≤ λx for x ∈ y, with equality for P∗(x | y) > 0.
By Lemma 8, λ′x = L(·, P∗(· | y)) for all x ∈ y, showing that the conditions of this
theorem hold. Conversely, if λ∗ satisfies the equality in this theorem, then
∑
x∈y P∗(x |
y)L(x, P(· | y)) = HL(P∗(· | y)), so λ∗ defines a supporting hyperplane at P∗(· | y).
For y with P∗(y) = 0, if the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is nowhere below HL  ∆y as
in Theorem 3, then using Lemma 4 it can be lowered to become a minimal supporting
hyperplane, for which a realizing Q∗|y exists; conversely, the existence of a supporting
hyperplane to HL  ∆y at Q∗|y that is nowhere above λ∗ implies that λ∗ is itself nowhere
below HL  ∆y.
Uniqueness of the KT-vector: For any worst-case optimal strategy P∗, the char-
acterization in this theorem puts an equality constraint on λ∗x for each x, so only one
vector can satisfy these conditions. We just saw that these conditions are equivalent to
those in Theorem 3, so λ∗ is the unique KT-vector.
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Characterization of Q∗: By Theorem 7, Q∗ is worst-case optimal for the contestant
if and only if the (unique) KT-vector equals the left-hand side of (9). Similarly, if
a strategy P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, then the KT-vector equals the
right-hand side of (9). Therefore: if for given Q∗ a worst-case optimal P∗ exists for
which (9) holds, then both sides equal the KT-vector and Q∗ is worst-case optimal; if
Q∗ is worst-case optimal, then (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P∗; and if, for given
Q∗, (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P∗, then it holds for at least one worst-case
optimal P∗ by the existence of worst-case optimal P∗.
Proof of Theorem 10. For local L, by definition L(x,Q) = fx(Q(x)) for some se-
quence of functions fx : [0, 1] → [0,∞]. Given a point P ∈ ∆y, the vector λ given
by λx = fx(P(x)) defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P, because L is proper.
Each fx is nonincreasing. (To see this, consider moving the point P along any line that
goes through the vertex of the simplex ∆X which puts all mass on some x. Because HL
is concave along this line, the farther away P is from that vertex, the higher a supporting
hyperplane to HL at P will be at that vertex.)
Given P∗ and q satisfying the conditions in this theorem, let λ∗x be fx(qx) for each
x ∈ X. We show that P∗ is worst-case optimal by verifying that P∗ and λ∗ satisfy
Theorem 3. For each y with P∗(y) > 0, λ∗ defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y
at P∗(· | y). For each other y, consider a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at Q|y(x) =
qx/
∑
x′∈y qx′ : because Q|y(x) ≥ qx, fx(Q|y(x)) ≤ fx(qx) = λ∗x, the hyperplane defined by
λ∗ is everywhere at least as high as this supporting hyperplane, as required.
For the converse: For strictly concave HL, fx is strictly decreasing. Define functions
gx as follows: gx(λx) = inf{q ∈ [0, 1] | fx(q) ≤ λx}. If fx is continuous, gx is just the
ordinary inverse of fx, but if fx has a jump discontinuity at q, there will be an interval
where gx is constantly equal to q. In either case, gx satisfies gx( fx(q)) = q for all
q ∈ [0, 1].
Take P∗ some worst-case optimal strategy, and λ∗ a KT-vector. Define q ∈ [0, 1]X
by qx = gx(λ∗x). We use Theorem 3 to show that q satisfies (10). For each y ∈ Y, let
λ′ ∈ Λy be a minimal supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y that obeys λ′ ≤ λ∗; such a
λ′ exists by Lemma 4. Let Q|y be the (unique) point at which λ′ supports HL  ∆y. It
satisfies fx(Q|y(x)) = λ′x, from which it follows that gx(λ′x) = gx( fx(Q|y(x))) = Q|y(x).
Applying gx to both sides of λ′x ≤ λ∗x, we get Q|y(x) ≥ qx for all x ∈ y, so that
∑
x∈y qx ≤∑
x∈y Q|y(x) = 1. If P∗(y) > 0, then the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is itself a supporting
hyperplane and Q|y is the point where it touches HL  ∆y, namely the point P∗(· | y).
Because Q|y(x) also satisfies Q|y(x) = gx(λ∗x) = qx, the equality qx = Q|y(x) = P∗(x | y)
follows.
Proof of Lemma 11. At least one vector q must exist because for the game with loga-
rithmic loss and X,Y, p as in the lemma, a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ must exist
by Theorem 3, and an associated RCAR vector q must exist for it by Theorem 10 using
that HL is strictly concave.
For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q and KT-vector λ∗ are related by λ∗x =
− log qx. By Theorem 3, any strategy P ∈ P that does not agree with the KT-vector λ∗
is not worst-case optimal, showing that q is unique.
41
Proof of Lemma 13. We will show that any nonvertical supporting hyperplane λ ∈
Λy is supporting at no more than one point P ∈ ∆y. By Lemma 4, if a supporting
hyperplane exists at P, then a minimum supporting hyperplane also exists at that point,
so it suffices to restrict our attention to minimal λ ∈ Λy. We know that such a λ is
realizable on y; let Q be a distribution realizing it. Then Q minimizes the expected loss
against any P at which λ supports HL  ∆y. For strictly proper L, there can be at most
one such P, proving strict concavity.
Proof of Lemma 14. The generalized entropy function of L′ is given by
HL′ (P) = aHL(P) +
∑
x∈X
bxP(x),
where a ∈ R>0 and b ∈ RX are the constants in the affine transformation (12). HL′
is again finite and continuous. If P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in game
G, then by Theorem 3 there exists a KT-vector λ∗ satisfying that theorem’s conditions.
Define a transformed vector by λ′ = aλ∗ + b. This is a KT-vector for G′, showing that
P∗ is also worst-case optimal in that game.
If the conditions of Theorem 5 hold for G, then they also holds for G′: If λ′ is
a minimal supporting hyperplane to HL′  ∆y, then λ = (1/a)(λ′ − b) is a minimal
supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y. By assumption, λ is realizable on y in game G, say
by Q ∈ ∆X. Then the same Q also realizes λ′ in game G′.
If Q∗ is worst-case optimal for the contestant in G, then by Theorem 7, λ given by
λx := maxy3x L(x,Q∗|y) is a KT-vector. The transformed vector λ
′ = aλ + b is then a
KT-vector in G′, so that by Theorem 7, Q∗ is worst-case optimal in that game.
Because the affine transformation from L into L′ can be reversed by a second affine
transformation (with a′ = 1/a and b′ = −(1/a)b), the reverse implications follow.
Proof of Lemma 16. For each y ∈ Y, assume without loss of generality that y ∈ Y1.
Then observe that the generalized entropies for G and G1 are identical on ∆y; P∗(y) > 0
if and only if P∗1(y) > 0; and P
∗(x | y) = P∗1(x | y) for all x ∈ y. Now the claim follows
from Theorem 3.
Proof of Lemma 17. By Theorem 3, λ∗ is supporting to HL  ∆y1 at P∗(· | y1). Define
λ1 ∈ Λy1 equal to λ∗ on y1. Then by Lemma 4, any λ′ ∈ Λy1 with λ′ ≤ λ1 obeys
λ′x1 = λ
1
x1 .
Again by Theorem 3, λ∗ is dominating to HL  ∆y2 . Define λ2 by λ2x = λ∗x for
x ∈ y1 ∩ y2, λ2x1 = λ∗x2 , and 0 elsewhere. Because L is symmetric between x1 and x2,
λ2 ∈ Λy1 . For x ∈ y1 ∩ y2, λ1x = λ2x. If λ2x1 ≤ λ1x1 , then λ2 ≤ λ1; then we must have
λ2x1 = λ
1
x1 . So λ
2
x1 < λ
1
x1 is impossible, and we find λ
∗
x1 = λ
1
x1 ≤ λ2x1 = λ∗x2 .
Proof of Theorem 18. For graph games, all loss functions are essentially local. We
will make this precise by constructing functions fx, analogous to those in the proof
of Theorem 10: they have the property that for all y ∈ Y, a supporting hyperplane to
HL  ∆y at P ∈ ∆y is given by λ with λx = fx(P(x)) for all x ∈ y. (Note that we may
not get fx(Q(x)) = L(x,Q) as in the case of local proper loss functions in the proof of
Theorem 10, because the hyperplane realized by Q may not be supporting at Q if L is
improper.)
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For each x ∈ X, if the only message in which x occurs is {x}, then fx(q) is only
defined for q = 1, where it is fx(1) = HL(ex) (where ex is the unique element of ∆y).
For other x, pick any message y ∈ Y with y 3 x and |y| = 2. For all these y, the
generalized entropies HL  ∆y are identical copies of the same function, by symmetry
of L. For each q ∈ [0, 1], pick a supporting hyperplane λ to HL  ∆y at the unique
P ∈ ∆y with P(x) = q, and let fx(q) = λx. If HL is not differentiable at P (including
when q ∈ {0, 1}), we can choose a supporting hyperplane arbitrarily as long as the same
one is used to define fx(q) and fx′ (1−q) wherever {x, x′} ∈ Y. (In particular this means
that if a connected component of Y viewed as a graph contains an odd cycle, fx(1/2)
must take the same value for all x in that component.)
As for local L, each fx is nonincreasing because HL is concave, and fx is strictly
decreasing if HL is strictly concave. The rest of the proof is the same as for Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 19. We know from Theorem 10 that a quizmaster strategy P∗ is
worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss if and only if it is RCAR, and from Theorem 3
that such a P∗ exists. Take any such P∗. Let λ be the KT-vector with respect to logarith-
mic loss, and YP∗ = {y ∈ Y | P∗(y) > 0}. For any pair y ∈ YP∗ , y′ ∈ Y, we will show
that there exists a bijection pi from y \ y′ to y′ \ y such that λx ≤ λpi(x) for all x ∈ y \ y′.
This follows from Schrijver [21, Corollary 39.12a], but here we give a direct proof by
induction on |y′ \ y|:
• |y′ \ y| = 1: Apply Lemma 17 to y1 = y and y2 = y′ (using that for an RCAR
strategy, P∗(y1) > 0 implies P∗(x1, y1) > 0 for all x1 ∈ y1) to find the required
inequality.
• |y′ \ y| > 1: Let y′1 = y′ and pick any x1 ∈ y \ y′. Starting with i = 1, apply the
basis exchange property on y \ {xi} and y′i to find x′i (it will be in y′i \ y ⊆ y′);
then apply it again on y′i \ {x′i } and y to find xi+1 ∈ y \ y′i , defining the message
y′i+1 = y
′
i \ {x′i } ∪ {xi+1} (which may not be in YP∗ ). Continue until xi+1 = x1.
Now pi defined by pi(x1) = x′1, . . . , pi(xi) = x
′
i is a bijection from {x1, . . . , xi} =
(y ∩ y′i+1) \ y′ ⊆ y \ y′ to {x′1, . . . , x′i } = y′ \ y′i+1 ⊆ y′ \ y (to see this, note that an
element x′j found in the basis exchange from y is then removed from y
′
j+1 so that
it will not be found again; an element x j+1 found in the other basis exchange is
added to y′j+1 with the same result), and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ i, applying Lemma 17
to y and y ∪ {x′j} \ {x j} tells us that λx j ≤ λx′j as required. If y′i+1 = y, then this is
the bijection we are looking for; otherwise, it can be completed by combining it
with a bijection from y \ y′i+1 to y′i+1 \ y, which exists by the induction hypothesis.
If also y′ ∈ YP∗ , a bijection pi′ from y′ \ y to y \ y′ such that λx′ ≤ λpi′(x′) is found by
the same argument. Together, pi and pi′ divide the outcomes in the two sets into disjoint
cycles that must all have the same value for λ, defining an equivalence relation ∼ on
y ⊕ y′. For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q obeys qx = e−λx , so it must also be
constant within each equivalence class of ∼. Because the entropy of logarithmic loss is
strictly concave, the conditionals of P∗ must agree with q by Theorem 10.
Now take an arbitrary loss function L satisfying the conditions in the theorem, and
the same strategy P∗. At an arbitrary message y with P∗(y) > 0, choose a supporting
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hyperplane λ′ ∈ Λy to HL  ∆y at P∗(· | y) with the property that λ′x = λ′x′ for all x, x′ ∈ y
with λx = λx′ and between which L is symmetric: there P∗(x | y) = P∗(x′ | y), so such
a supporting hyperplane exists. For all x, x′ ∈ y with qx > qx′ (equivalently, λx < λx′ )
between which L is symmetric, this λ′ satisfies λ′x ≤ λ′x′ . (A supporting hyperplane to
HL  ∆y at P∗(· | y) with λ′x > λ′x′ would be lower at (P∗)x↔x
′
(· | y) than at P∗(· | y),
while by symmetry HL is the same at those points: a contradiction.)
For each y′ ∈ YP∗ other than y, we saw that each x′ ∈ y′\y is in the same equivalence
class of ∼ as some x ∈ y \ y′. In addition to λx = λx′ , x ∼ x′ implies that L is symmetric
between x and x′ (because L is symmetric with respect to exchanges inY, and pi and pi′
were constructed using such exchanges). We extend the definition of λ′ to y′ by setting
λ′x′ = λ
′
x. This way, λ
′ defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y′ at P∗(· | y′). We
repeat this for all y′ ∈ YP∗ , defining λ′ on all of X.
Also, for each y′ ∈ Y\YP∗ and y ∈ YP∗ , we have that a bijection pi exists from y\y′
to y′ \ y such that for all x ∈ y \ y′, L is symmetric between x and pi(x), and λx ≤ λpi(x);
then also λ′x ≤ λ′pi(x), so λ′ defines a dominating hyperplane to HL  ∆y′ . Thus λ′ is a
KT-vector certifying that P∗ is also worst-case optimal for L.
For the converse: If HL is strictly concave, the supporting hyperplanes defined by
a KT-vector λ′ each touch HL  ∆y at only one point, so that any worst-case optimal
strategy P′ for the quizmaster must have P′(x | y) = qx for all x ∈ y with P′(y) > 0.
Therefore any worst-case optimal P′ must be RCAR.
Proof of Theorem 20. We will first show how to construct a vector q ∈ RX>0 that sat-
isfies
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y, and for all x ∈ X, there is a message x ∈ y ∈ Y with∑
x∈y qx = 1. Then we will determine a marginal so that this vector q is the RCAR
vector of the game with that marginal. We will additionally find two intersecting mes-
sages, both having sum 1, such that q represents the uniform distribution on one, but
not on the other.
Two different constructions are given: one for nonuniform and one for uniform
games.
If the game is not uniform, let k2 be the size of the largest message in Y. By con-
nectedness, there exists a message of size less than k2 that has nonempty intersection
with a message of size k2. From among such messages, let y1 be one of maximum size,
and let k1 < k2 be that size. Finally, let y2 be a messages of size k2 that maximizes
|y2 ∩ y1|. Set initial values for q as follows:
qx =

1
k1
for x ∈ y1;
|y1\y2 |
|y2\y1 | · 1k1 for x ∈ y2 \ y1;
1
|y2\y1 | · 1k1 otherwise.
Note that the three cases of qx are listed in nonincreasing order. Now
∑
x∈y1 qx =∑
x∈y2 qx = 1, while
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 for general y ∈ Y: maxx qx = 1/k1, so a message
y ∈ Y with |y| ≤ k1 will have sum at most 1; a message with |y| = k2 will share no
more outcomes with y1 than y2 does and thus cannot have a larger sum; and because a
message with k1 < |y| < k2 has empty intersection with y2, the k1 − 1 largest elements
of (qx)x∈y sum to at most (k1 − 1)/k1, while the fewer than |y2 \ y1| remaining elements
all equal 1/(|y2 \ y1| · k1) and hence sum to less than 1/k1.
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A greedy algorithm that repeatedly increments some qx until none can be increased
further, while maintaining the inequality
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 on each y, will terminate with a q
satisfying the conditions stated at the beginning of the proof. This q will be unchanged
and thus still be uniform on y1, while on the intersecting message y2, q also still sums
to 1 but is not uniform.
For the case of uniform games, the construction is similar. Let k be the size of the
game’s messages. By Oxley [24, Corollary 2.1.5], a nonempty family of sets Y is the
collection of bases of a matroid if and only if for all y1, y2 ∈ Y and x2 ∈ y2 \ y1,
y1 ∪ {x2} \ {x1} ∈ Y for some x1 ∈ y1 \ y2. (A.3)
Because our Y is not a matroid, it follows that there exist y1, y2 ∈ Y and x2 ∈ y2 \ y1
for which no corresponding x1 exists. For k ≥ 3 (which holds because the game we
consider is not a graph game), we claim something stronger: that there exist y1, y2, x2
as above with the additional property that y1 and y2 intersect. The proof of this claim
is below.
Using such y1 and x2 and some 0 <  < 1/k, initialize q as follows:
qx =

1
k for x ∈ y1;
1
k +  for x = x2;
1
k −  otherwise.
Because any message containing x2 also contains at least one other outcome not in y1,
we again have
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y.
For k ≥ 3, the initial q has the property that the set of outcomes x for which qx
cannot be increased further (we call these outcomes maximized) is connected by mes-
sages y with
∑
x∈y x = 1 (that is, the maximized outcomes cannot be partitioned into
two nonempty sets such that each sum-1 message is contained in one of these sets);
this is because y1 has sum 1, and any other message with sum 1 must intersect y1. (For
k = 2, this would not be the case: the only messages having sum 1 would be y1 and
all messages that contain x2, but y1 would not intersect any of these.) We can have the
greedy algorithm maintain this as an invariant: Because the game is connected, there
is always a message partially in the set of maximized outcomes and partially outside.
We call such a message a crossing message. Each round, we pick an outcome x that is
not maximized yet and is contained in a crossing message; if x2 is not maximized, we
always pick x = x2 (using that it is contained in the crossing message y2). The tightest
constraint on increasing qx will come from a crossing message, because for any non-
crossing message y 3 x, we have ∑x′∈y\{x} qx′ = (k − 1)(1/k − ), which is the smallest
possible value of this sum. So increasing qx as much as possible will cause a crossing
message to get sum equal to 1. This message connects x to the set of previously max-
imized outcomes, and any other outcomes that were maximized by this increment must
be contained in some message that also contains x.
When the greedy algorithm terminates, q will still be uniform on y1, while there
will be another message on which q sums to one but is not uniform. (This may not
be y2, which may not have sum 1.) Because all outcomes are connected by sum-1
messages, we can also find a pair of intersecting messages, one of which is uniform
and one of which is not. Use these two messages as y1 and y2 in the sequel.
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Having found, for both nonuniform and uniform games, a vector q and messages
y1 and y2 as described above, we let strategy P be RCAR with vector q and P(y) uni-
form on {y | ∑x∈y qx = 1}. This P is a worst-case optimal strategy for the game with
logarithmic loss and marginal px =
∑
y3x P(x, y), and q is its unique RCAR vector.
We will show that P is not worst-case optimal for the game with the same marginal
and Brier loss. Brier loss is proper and continuous, so by Theorem 9, L(x, P(· | y1)) =
L(x, P(· | y2)) for worst-case optimal P. These are squared Euclidean distances from a
vertex of the simplex to the predicted distribution. However, the equality will not hold
for P:
Among all predictions in ∆yi with Q(x) = qx for each x ∈ y1 ∩ y2 (this set of
predictions is the intersection of ∆yi with an affine subspace), the squared Euclidean
distance L(x,Q) between such Q and given vertex x ∈ y1∩y2 is uniquely minimized by
Q uniform on the outcomes not in y1∩y2 (this is the orthogonal projection of the vertex
onto that subspace). For a uniform game, P(· | y1) is uniform and thus L(x, P(· | y1))
equals this minimum; P(· | y1) differs from the uniform distribution at some outcomes
not in y1 ∩ y2 and thus L(x, P(· | y2)) is larger than the minimum.
For a nonuniform game, P(· | y1) is uniform on y1 \ y2 and P(· | y2) is uniform
on y2 \ y1, so both minimize the distance to the vertex in their respective subspaces.
However, the subspace for y2 is isomorphic to a subspace contained in the subspace for
y1 and not containing P(· | y1). Therefore L(x, P(· | y1)) < L(x, P(· | y2)).
Proof of claim. Suppose for a contradiction that any pair of intersecting messages y, y′
obeys the above exchange property (A.3) for all x′ ∈ y′ \ y. Let y1, y2 be two messages
that fail (A.3) for some outcome x2 ∈ y2 \ y1; it follows from our assumption that they
are disjoint. BecauseY is connected, there exists a sequence of messages starting with
y1 and ending with y2 in which adjacent messages intersect. Using (A.3), we can extend
this sequence to one where adjacent messages differ by the exchange of one outcome:
given intersecting y, y′′ ∈ Y with d := |y′′ \ y| > 1, we find y′ ∈ Y with |y′ \ y| = 1 and
|y′′ \ y′| = d − 1. Write the entire sequence as y0 = y1, y1, . . . , yn = y2.
We have n ≥ k, because n < k would imply that y1 ∩ y2 , ∅. If n > k, we can find a
shorter sequence as follows: pick 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − k for which yi ∩ y j+1 , ∅; this holds
if j + 1 − i < k, so such i, j can always be found if k ≥ 3. Let x′ be the unique outcome
in y j+1 \ y j.
• If x′ < y j+k (intuitively, adding x′ leads us on a detour that can be avoided when
going to y j+k): In each of the k exchange steps from y j to y j+k, one outcome was
removed. One of those outcomes was x′, which is not in y j, so at most k − 1
outcomes from y j were removed. Thus y j and y j+k intersect, and a shorter path
between them can be found using (A.3).
• If x′ ∈ y j+k and x′ ∈ yi (removing x′ is the start of a detour): We can use (A.3) to
find a shorter path between yi and y j+k.
• If x′ ∈ y j+k but x′ < yi (adding x′ is apparently useful, but can be done sooner):
Apply (A.3) to messages yi and y j+1 (which intersect) and outcome x′ (which
is in y j+1 but not in yi) to find a message y′ that is one step away from yi and
contains x′. From y′, we can find a path to y j+k by (A.3) taking fewer than k
steps. Thus we can get from yi to y j+k in at most k steps.
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Thus we can always find a sequence with n = k.
Given such a sequence y0, y1, . . . , yn, we will now show a contradiction with the
assumption that y1 = y0 and y2 = yn fail (A.3) by showing that for any x2 ∈ y2, a
message exists that differs from y1 by adding x2 and removing one other outcome. If
x2 ∈ y1, then y1 is such a message and we are done. Otherwise, we can apply (A.3)
to y1 and x2 ∈ y2 to find a message y′ containing x2; because k ≥ 3, this message still
intersects y1, so applying (A.3) to y1 and x2 ∈ y′ gives the message we are looking
for. This shows by contradiction that if a connected uniform game with k ≥ 3 is not
a matroid game, there exists a pair of intersecting messages y1, y2 and an outcome
x2 ∈ y2 \ y1 that do not satisfy (A.3).
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